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This chapter discusses the concept of the second demographic transition (SDT) and 
its  relevance  for  explaining  the  ongoing  changes  in  family  and  fertility  patterns 
across Europe. It takes a closer look at the shifts in values and attitudes related to 
family, reproduction, and children, and their representation in different chapters in 
this collection. It re-examines the link between the second demographic transition 
and  fertility,  highlights  its  strong  positive  association  with  fertility  at  later 
childbearing ages, and suggests that the transition does not necessarily lead to sub-
replacement fertility levels. Subsequently, it provides an extensive discussion on the 
progression of the SDT behind the former ‘Iron Curtain.’ To explain some apparent 
contradictions  in  this  process,  it  employs  a  conceptual  model  of  ‘readiness, 
willingness, and ability’ (RWA) advocated by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001). 
It  also  explores  the  multifaceted  nature  of  the  second  demographic  transition 
between different social groups, and points out an apparent paradox: whereas lower-
educated  individuals  often  embrace  values  that  can  be  characterised  as  rather 
traditional,  they  also  frequently  manifest  family  behaviour  associated  with  the 
transition, such as non-marital childbearing, high partnership instability, and high 
prevalence of long-term cohabitation. This suggests that there may be two different 
pathways of the progression of the second demographic transition. The concluding 
section points out the role of structural constraints for the diffusion of the transition 
among  disadvantaged  social  strata,  highlights  the  importance  of  the  ‘gender 
revolution’ for the SDT trends, and discusses the usefulness of the SDT framework.  
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1. Introduction: the fluidity of the ‘second demographic 
transition’  
The  idea  of  the  second  demographic  transition  was  first  suggested  by  Ron 
Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa in 1986, when it referred to interrelated changes in 
fertility,  family  formation,  and  partnership  behaviour,  which  started  in  the  late 
1960s in many countries of Western and Northern Europe. The term transition—
initially used with a question mark reflecting uncertainty about it (van de Kaa 2002: 
9)—shows  that  its  proponents  became  convinced  that  a  long-lasting  change  in 
demographic regime was under way. This change was closely related to substantial 
shifts  in  values  related  to  family  life  and  children,  and  was  marked  by  the 
weakening of the ‘traditional’ family as an institution. Decline in fertility rates well 
below the replacement level, facilitated by the spread of modern contraception, was 
perceived as the main feature of the transition (van de Kaa 1987: 4). The concept of 
the second demographic transition (SDT) has been subsequently elaborated upon in 
numerous publications (e.g., Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 1994, 2001 and 2002; 
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002 and 2004). It has tentatively incorporated mortality 
and  migration,  and  has  been  broadly  linked  to  numerous  structural  changes 
(modernization,  the  growth  of  the  service  economy  and  the  welfare  state,  the 
expansion  of  higher  education),  cultural  changes  (secularization,  the  rise  of 
individualistic  values,  the  importance  of  self-expression  and  self-fulfilment)  and 
technological  changes  (the  adoption  of  modern  contraception,  the  advances  in 
assisted reproduction, the explosion of new information technologies) (see van de 
Kaa 1994). According to van de Kaa (1996: 425), the second demographic transition 
has become a “quintessential narrative of ideational and cultural change,” whose 
main  distinction  from  the  first  demographic  transition  is  the  “overwhelming 
preoccupation  with  self-fulfilment,  personal  freedom  of  choice,  personal 
development  and  lifestyle,  and  emancipation,  as  reflected  in  family  formation, 
attitudes towards fertility regulation and the motivation for parenthood.” A stylised 
discussion  of  the  development  over  time  of  the  second  demographic  transition 
concept,  and  of  associated  ideas,  is  provided  by  van  de  Kaa  (2002)  in  a  paper 
entitled “The idea of a Second Demographic Transition in industrialized countries.” 
The  widening  scope  of  the  second  demographic  transition  concept  and  its 
evolution over time imply that it has become broadly used as a label, description, 
and even explanation for a plethora of diverse changes in fertility and family-related 
behaviours and attitudes, to the point where its usage “has escaped the control of its 
initial proponents” (Billari and Wilson 2001: 3). Considerable ambiguity prevails 
among demographers about the concept, its main facets and its main underlying 
mechanisms: to many observers, it remains unclear what the transition really is and Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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how  to  define  it.  Adding  to  this  definition  problem,  the  crucial  elements  of  the 
transition may change over time: for instance, van de Kaa (2002: 29) suggests that 
“while  below  replacement  fertility  currently  is  a  crucial  element  of  the  Second 
Transition, this need not be a permanent state.” Different facets of the SDT idea 
have  attracted  considerable  amount  of  criticism.  Cliquet  argued  that  there  is  no 
apparent discontinuity between the first and the second demographic transition; he 
views demographic changes of the last decades as “a new acceleration in relational 
and reproductive patterns, associated to modernization” (Cliquet 1991: 28, see also 
counter-arguments  by  Lesthaeghe  and  Neels  2002  and  Lesthaeghe  and  Surkyn 
2004). The timing of the onset of the SDT can be disputed as well. For instance, van 
Bavel (2007) has shown using an example of low fertility between the First and 
Second  World  Wars  that  contemporary  interpretations  of  below-replacement 
fertility centred on the factors frequently associated with the second demographic 
transition,  such  as  secularisation,  changes  in  the  character  of  marriage, 
consumerism, increased economic aspirations, and the conflict between employment 
and motherhood. The idea of a ‘transition’ seemingly suggests that there is a ‘final 
state,’ a new demographic regime on which different societies eventually converge. 
However, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa neither formally define a starting point, nor 
envision  any  quantifiable  endpoint  of  the  transition.
2  What  matters  in  their 
arguments is not an envisioned ‘end-of-transition’ equilibrium, but rather a direction 
of changes and trajectories, which are generally shared across countries.  
But even the idea of such widely shared behavioural and value changes raises a 
question about the eventual convergence among countries and diverse social groups 
in their family patterns and demographic characteristics.  While on an individual 
level the transition may be expected to lead to an increased variability in fertility 
and family behaviours, and result in a ‘pluralisation of family forms,’ the notion of 
common cross-country trends suggests that the differences between countries are 
likely to diminish. However, many researchers emphasise the persistent diversity in 
family patterns and living arrangements across Europe (e.g., Kuijsten 1996), which 
has  historical  roots  (e.g.,  Reher  1998).  Consequently,  some  scholars  argue  that 
different types of changes in family and fertility “cannot simply be interpreted in 
one model of the second demographic transition” (de Beer, Corijn and Deven 2000: 
124, see also Micheli 2004: 80). Micheli (2004) proposes that family patterns in 
Europe  remain  strongly  regionally  embedded,  and  that,  in  contrast  to  Northern 
Europe,  modernisation  has  led  to  a  revitalisation  of  the  ‘kinship-alliance  family 
                                                            
2 Noting that the outcome of the second demographic transition cannot be predicted with any certainty, 
and that it is unlikely to lead to any sort of equilibrium, van de Kaa (2004b: xiii) suggested that the term 
‘revolution’—which does not imply a shift from one steady state to another—would probably have been 
a better label for the ongoing “change in demographic regime.”    Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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patterns’  in  the  South.
3  Also,  the  hypothesised  synchronicity  between  the 
behavioural and value changes occasionally attracts criticism. Rotariu (2006: 19), 
for instance, suggests that in Romania the behavioural change manifested by falling 
fertility  rates,  fertility  postponement,  and  rising  proportion  of  non-marital  births 
“appears to precede the shift in the system of values and attitudes toward family and 
children.”    Another  common  criticism  of  the  SDT  concept  is  its  anchoring  in 
European,  or,  when  viewed  from  an  even  narrower  perspective,  Northwestern 
European patterns of demographic changes, which make it far from certain that it 
will spread to other parts of the world (Coleman 2004). Some contributions indicate 
that the SDT, or at least many of its features, is well underway in non-European 
advanced societies (see Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006 for the U.S. and Matsuo 2001 
and Rindfuss et al. 2004 for Japan), but the differences in family-related behaviours 
and attitudes between North-western Europe and most advanced Asian countries, 
like Japan or Korea, remain enormous. Finally, there may be a problem with the 
term itself: Coleman (2004) claims that the second demographic transition concerns 
mostly  changes  in  living  arrangements,  and  can  therefore  hardly  be  labelled 
‘demographic.’  
The broadness and the fluidity of the transition narrative have, to some extent, 
hindered empirical studies examining its validity and the spread of the transition in 
different societies and regions. With a rising acceptance of the concept, the number 
of articles investigating the SDT in different countries has increased (e.g., de Beer, 
Corijn  and  Deven  2000;  Sobotka,  Zeman,  and  Kantorová  2003,  Lesthaeghe  and 
Neidert 2006, Kertzer et al. 2006, Rotariu 2006, Gerber and Berman 2006, and 
Gerber and Cottrell 2006). Despite valid criticisms of the ‘transition’ framework, it 
is worthwhile to discuss the spread of the second demographic transition in Europe, 
and outline how it is reflected in the country-specific chapters in this collection. The 
various  reasons  for  focusing  on  the  second  demographic  transition  can  be 
summarised as follows. First, the fact that the SDT has become a rather established 
concept,  which  is  often  used  to  understand  changes  in  demographic  behaviour 
(Liefbroer  and  Fokkema  2008)  and  which  is  also  discussed  in  many  country 
chapters, warrants specific attention. Second, the significance of a substantial shift 
in  family-related  behaviour  and  attitudes  in  advanced  societies  in  the  last  four 
decades  has  been  recognised  not  only  by  numerous  demographers,  but  also  by 
                                                            
3 Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa acknowledge huge cross-country heterogeneity in the SDT progression. 
Van de Kaa (2002: 31) concludes, nevertheless, that the persistent differences “are variations on the 
common themes: major changes in fertility, a redefinition of the model of the family, improvements in 
mortality, and becoming countries of immigration.” He then concludes that “[i]t is our inability to explain 
these changes as a purely temporary disturbance, which convinces me that describing them as a ‘Second 
Demographic Transition’ is warranted.” Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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researchers  from  other  disciplines.  Some  of  the  well-known  sociological  books, 
including Inglehart’s (1990) Culture shift in advanced industrial society, Gidden’s 
(1992)  The  transformation  of  intimacy,  or  Bauman’s  (2000)  Liquid  modernity 
provide convincing arguments about the intensity of changes in the character of 
partnerships,  family,  and  childbearing,  and  the  values  attached  to  them.  Many 
family economists  have also recognised that the  ‘Western’ family  has entered a 
period of rapid change (Lundberg and Pollak 2007); Goldin (2006) speaks about the 
‘quiet revolution’ in women’s lives, and emphasises the link between the spread of 
the  contraceptive  pill,  extended  education,  postponement  of  marriage,  and  the 
change in women’s identity and career orientation. Third, an examination of the 
second demographic transition sheds light on different factors affecting the shifts in 
demographic behaviour, and on the relation between changing values and attitudes, 
and changing family-related behaviours. Fourth, the discussion about the second 
demographic transition is particularly illuminative in the case of the post-communist 
societies  of  Central,  Eastern,  and  South-eastern  Europe,  all  of  which  have 
experienced  numerous  ‘symptoms’  of  the  SDT  behaviour.  Scholars  disagree, 
however, on the extent and  significance of the diffusion  of individualistic  value 
orientation in this region. This debate, which has been often simplistically reduced 
to ‘cultural change’ vs. ‘economic crisis’ arguments (see Overview Chapter 5
∗), may 
also contribute to our ability to foresee future family changes in the former state-
socialist societies. It is not by coincidence that most chapters on Central and Eastern 
Europe explicitly discuss the relevance of the second demographic transition model 
for explaining recent changes in family behaviour. 
This chapter is closely related to Overview Chapter 4, which outlines changes 
in family life and living arrangements in Europe since the 1960s, illustrating many 
trends that constitute the backbone of the second demographic transition. Taking 
profound  family  transformation  as  a  starting  point,  this  chapter  looks  at  the 
relevance  of  the  SDT  concept  for  explaining  the  ongoing  changes  in  fertility 
patterns and takes a closer look at the shifts in values and attitudes related to family, 
reproduction, and children. It re-examines the link between the second demographic 
transition  and  sub-replacement  fertility,  and  pays  special  attention  to  the 
‘progression’  of  the  second  demographic  transition  behind  the  former  ‘Iron 
Curtain.’  To  explain  some  apparent  contradictions  in  this  process,  it  employs  a 
conceptual  model  of  ‘readiness,  willingness,  and  ability’  (RWA)  advocated  by 
Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001). It also discusses the multifaceted nature of the 
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second demographic transition between different social groups, and points out an 
apparent paradox:  whereas lower-educated individuals often embrace values that 
can  be  characterised  as  rather  traditional,  they  also  frequently  manifest  most 
pronounced features of family behaviour associated with the transition, such as non-
marital childbearing, high partnership instability, and high prevalence of long-term 
cohabitation. The concluding section summarises the main findings, speculates on 
two possible pathways of the progression of the second demographic transition, and 
provides notes on selected factors fuelling this transition. Finally, a brief reflection 
on the  usefulness and validity of the SDT concept is provided. Throughout  this 
chapter, I use interchangeably the terms ‘transition,’  ‘second transition,’ ‘second 
demographic transition,’ as well as an acronym, ‘SDT.’ I use these terms in a rather 
broad sense, trying to avoid their narrow deterministic interpretation.  
 
 
2. Changes in values and attitudes related to family life, 
childbearing, and sexuality  
Diverse contributions provide strong support for the notion of a profound change in 
attitudes and values related to childbearing, family life, living arrangements, and 
sexuality; as well as a relative decline of the importance of family in the hierarchy 
of values everywhere in Europe. Albania, a country which had been almost isolated 
from the rest of Europe until 1990, constitutes a notable exception: early marriage 
and  childbearing  remain  universal,  cohabitation  is  rare,  and  traditional 
contraception, especially withdrawal, still constitutes the dominant mode of birth 
control (Albania chapter).
4 Although the profound change in family-related values 
appears to be universal, the diversity between countries is enormous, shaped by their 
culture, history, family policies, and different pace of secularisation. One important 
aspect  of  family  attitudes  provides  continuity  with  the  era  preceding  the  SDT: 
whereas  the  acceptance  of  voluntary  childlessness  and  non-family  living 
arrangements  has  risen  rapidly,  and  marriage  and  family  life  have  increasingly 
become ‘optional,’ attitudes towards parenthood remain overwhelmingly positive in 
practically all the analysed societies. This is in parallel with similar findings in the 
United States, where not only parenthood, but also marriage remain valued, desired, 
and centrally significant to the vast majority of Americans (Thornton and Young-
DeMarco 2001). 
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The value attached to children and parenthood 
Remarkably, children and parenthood continue to be almost universally valued even 
in societies that have progressed furthest in the second demographic transition (e.g., 
France chapter; see also Fokkema and Esveldt 2008). A number of chapters in this 
collection  indicate  that  voluntary  childlessness  remains  rather  marginal
5,  and 
parenthood  is  still  at  the  top  of  people’s  life  priorities  (Liefbroer  and  Fokkema 
2008). Despite rising instability of partnerships, family life often continues to be 
strongly valued and idealised (the Czech Republic chapter). But behind this general 
picture, a number of subtle shifts can be recognised. Parenthood gradually ceases to 
be the main goal in the lives of men and women (e.g., Austria chapter). Concomitant 
to  that,  the  importance  of  leisure  and  friends  increases,  and  the  acceptance  of 
voluntary childlessness spreads (Sweden chapter) – having children is no longer 
considered a precondition to achieving happiness and self-fulfilment (van de Kaa 
2004a). The unwillingness to give up leisure activities scores prominently among 
the  reasons  for  not  having  a(nother)  child,  especially  among  childless  women 
(Austria, Lithuania, and Germany chapters). In line with van de Kaa’s (1987) and 
Ariès’  (1980)  reasoning,  the  motivation  for  parenthood  changes  profoundly: 
childbearing is less frequently seen as a ‘duty towards society,’ and instead becomes 
a  result  of  a  carefully  planned  decision  of  a  couple,  who  may  consider  various 
potential positive and negative effects of parenthood on their relationship, lifestyle, 
and economic wellbeing (Slovenia and Sweden chapter; see also Liefbroer 2005). 
Having  children  ceases  to  be  a  normatively-bound  decision,  and  it  increasingly 
serves individual self-fulfilment and private joy (Fokkema and Esveldt 2008). The 
Netherlands chapter quotes Beets et al. (2001), who emphasise the importance of 
modern contraception in this process, which led to the change in the perception of 
‘having children’ to the decision of ‘taking children’ (kinderen nemen). Importantly, 
this shift also implies more demanding prerequisites of parenthood and a greater 
emphasis on the norm of responsible parenthood (Slovenia and Spain chapters).
6 
                                                            
5 However, Sobotka and Testa (2008) found a significant level of intended childlessness and relatively 
high uncertainty about parenthood plans among childless women and men of reproductive age in 13 
European countries that participated in the Population Policy Acceptance Survey in 2001-2003. The 
intention to remain childless was most frequently expressed by West German respondents, suggesting an 
emergence of a ‘culture of childlessness’ in this region.   
6 These increasing demands on parent’s ability to raise a child seem to run contrary to the notion that the 
second transition implies a shift from ‘altruistic’ to ‘individualistic’ motivations for parenthood, i.e., a 
shift from child-centred to parent-centred perspective (van de Kaa 1987, Ariès’ 1980). Present-day 
parents need to sacrifice a substantial amount of resources (especially time, but also money) to raise and 
educate their children in conformity to the norm of responsible parenthood. At the same time, successful 
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Consequently, the stress and the difficulties connected with the proper upbringing of 
children may emerge as important reasons for not having an additional child (Spain 
chapter).  Finally,  the  position  of  children  in  the  family  changes  as  well,  as 
educational practices are based less on strict discipline, and focus more on “rational 
reasoning with children,” who become equal members of the family (Toulemon  et 
al. 2008:524).   
 
 
More tolerant attitudes towards non-marital childbearing 
Across Europe, childbearing outside marriage has experienced an explosive increase 
(Overview Chapter 4) and is “becoming socially acceptable at all ages and in all 
social  strata”  (Zakharov  2008:934).  More  positive  attitudes  towards  extramarital 
childbearing are typical of younger persons and the residents of big cities (Poland 
chapter).  Arguably,  the  enactment  of  legislation  that  provided  equal  rights  to 
married and unmarried parents might have contributed both to an increase in non-
marital childbearing, and to a wider acceptance of this phenomenon (Slovenia and 
Spain chapters). However, a distinction should be made between the acceptance of 
childbearing  within  a  stable  cohabiting  union,  which  often  receives  general 
approval,  and  childbearing  among  single  mothers,  which  is  frequently  seen  as 
undesired behaviour linked to an unstable socio-economic situation.   
 
 
The rising popularity of cohabitation and non-family living arrangements 
Unmarried cohabitation, especially as a pre-marital living arrangement, is perceived 
positively  in  most  European  countries,  even  when  the  actual  prevalence  of 
cohabitation  remains  relatively  low  (Pongrácz  and  Spéder  2008).  Liefbroer  and 
Fokkema  (2008)  have  noted  that,  as  early  as  1994,  a  majority  of  younger 
respondents (aged 18-35) in 20 countries participating in the International Social 
Surveys Program agreed that it is acceptable for a couple to live together without 
intending to get married. Remarkably, at that time cohabitation was rather rare in 
some of the countries participating in this survey, particularly in Italy, Poland, and 
Spain. Furthermore, a majority of respondents in all these countries except Poland 
also agreed that “it is a good idea to cohabit prior to entering marriage.” In most 
cases,  the  approval  of  cohabitation  further  increased  between  1994  and  2002, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
though demanding childrearing brings satisfaction to parents, and may be seen as a part of an 
individualistic motivation for ‘self-fulfilling’ parenthood.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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especially in regions where it was relatively low in 1994 (Liefbroer and Fokkema 
2008: Table 1). 
Despite being granted general approval, cohabitation in many countries is still 
perceived  as  a  pre-marital  stage  of  a  short  duration,  a  sort  of  ‘trial  marriage’ 
(chapters on Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain). Some contributions show that, 
over time, pre-marital cohabitation becomes established as a new norm (the Czech 
Republic,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden  chapters),  whereas  ‘direct  marriage’ 
becomes a minority option typical of specific religious and ethnic communities.  
Even  in  countries  where  unmarried  cohabitation  has  become  recognized  as 
equal to marriage, a large majority of people do not see marriage as an outdated 
institution, and most unmarried couples eventually plan to get married. Whereas the 
superiority  of  marriage  is  commonly  rejected,  marriage  remains  a  desirable  and 
generally  preferred  living  arrangement  (Pongrácz  and  Spéder  2008).  Family  life 
continues to be highly and almost universally valued. This pattern is most clearly 
outlined  in  the  Sweden  chapter:  although  Sweden  is  frequently  categorised  as  a 
country with a ‘weak family system,’ where individualism and residential autonomy 
play a very important role, Swedes “are somewhat more likely than the ‘average 
European’ to say that the family is very important in their life” (Oláh and Bernhardt 
2008:1120). Lifelong cohabitation or a ‘living apart together’ (LAT) relationship is 
preferred by a relatively small minority of younger respondents (Sobotka and Testa 
2008), but there is also evidence of a rising popularity of these living arrangements 
over time (the Netherlands chapter). In particular, leaving the parental home to live 
independently without a partner has become increasingly common among young 
adults (the Netherlands chapter).  
 
 
Attitudes towards sex and contraception  
As  Overview  Chapter  3  shows,  the  use  of  modern  contraception  has  reached 
relatively high levels in most regions of Europe, and, recently, it has been spreading 
rapidly in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe. Contraceptive use is broadly 
accepted  by  all  segments  of  the  population;  there  is  significant  opposition  to 
contraception  only  in  some  Catholic  countries  with  a  large  proportion  of 
conservative religious people, such as in Poland and Slovakia. The Poland chapter 
notes  that,  for  almost  one-tenth  of  respondents,  contraceptive  use  remains 
unacceptable. Similarly, deeply religious women in Slovakia have negative attitudes 
towards  birth  control  and  premarital  sex  (Slovakia  chapter).  In  Italy,  the  strong 
opposition  of  the  Catholic  Church  to  modern  contraception  and  its  continuing Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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influence  on  many  institutions,  including  the  media,  may  partly  explain  a  slow 
diffusion of the pill (Dalla Zuanna, De Rose, and Racioppi 2005). 
The  spread  of  modern  contraception,  especially  of  the  pill,  has  helped  to 
separate sex, procreation, and marriage; and arguably had a direct impact on the 
norms regarding sexual and reproductive behaviour (van de Kaa 1987 and 1994). In 
the majority of ‘Western’ societies, sexual activity among unmarried people of all 
ages, including young adults, is now considered a normal part of a satisfactory life. 
For instance, the Sweden chapter notes a “positive attitude towards sexual activity 
among young people, including those not living in co-residential partnerships” (see 
also Bracher and Santow 1998). This seems to be in contrast to the United States, 
where  many  people  embrace  restrictive  attitudes  towards  premarital  sex,  and 
towards sex among teenagers in particular (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). 
However, most people continue to disapprove of extramarital (or extra-partnership) 
affairs; such sexual contacts have, in fact, become generally less accepted over time 
(see Kraaykamp 2002 for the Netherlands and Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001 
for  the  U.S.).
7  This  trend  seemingly  goes  against  the  current  of  rising  sexual 
permissiveness, but it is concomitant with the idealisation of marriage and the shift 
in the character of intimate partnerships, which have become increasingly based on 




3. Is sub-replacement fertility a necessary feature of the second 
demographic transition?  
The concept of the second demographic transition, as formulated by its proponents, 
is related to fertility levels and trends in three distinct respects. First, the SDT brings 
a massive postponement of parenthood, which is facilitated by the widespread use 
of  modern contraception, and  which enables couples to  concentrate on pursuing 
other goals earlier in life. Second, as a result of spreading cohabitation and rising 
union instability, the SDT leads to a marked rise in the proportion of non-marital 
births. Third, the transition leads to “structural long-term subreplacement fertility” 
(Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006: 669). The fall in period fertility rates is first fuelled 
by  a  reduction  in  higher-order  fertility,  and  later  by  the  postponement  of 
                                                            
7 Kraaykamp (2002: Table 1) documents a brief and strong upward shift between 1965 and 1970, and a 
subsequent gradual decline in the percentage of Dutch respondents agreeing with the statement, “A single 
affair can do no harm to a good marriage,” from a high value of 45% in 1970 to 19% in 1995.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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parenthood.
8 Although some fertility recuperation usually occurs once women who 
had  postponed  births  have  children  later  in  life,  most  often  this  recovery  is  not 
sufficient to bring fertility back to the replacement level and, as a result, the “cohort 
fertility of currently reproducing women is expected to reach a maximum value well 
below replacement” (van de Kaa 2002: 10). While the SDT constitutes a complex 
narrative of demographic change, low fertility is often – and rather simplistically – 
perceived  as  a  main  symptom  of  this  transition.  Since  this  collection  primarily 
focuses on fertility changes and their determinants, I discuss the SDT-fertility link 
in greater detail. 
The relationship between delayed childbearing and the second demographic 
transition  has  been  relatively  firmly  established;  the  onset  of  the  recent  long-
standing fertility postponement also constitutes a suitable indicator of the onset of 
the SDT (Sobotka 2004: 58). A number of indicators capturing different aspects of 
the shift towards late timing of childbearing are closely correlated with the second 
demographic  transition.  This  can  be  illustrated  with  the  use  of  an  SDT  index 
constructed on the basis of characteristic changes in values and attitudes, as captured 
in the 1999 round of the European Values Surveys (data reported in Halman 2001). 
This index, termed SDT2, ranges from 0 to 10 (10 represents the highest possible 
score  on  ‘SDT-related’  values  and  attitudes).  It  is  introduced  in  more  detail  in 
Sobotka (2008), and its components are listed in the Appendix. The SDT2 index is 
relatively closely correlated with the timing of the onset of fertility postponement, 
with the mean age at first birth (in 1999 and in 2006), and negatively correlated with 
fertility rates below age 25 (see also below). A close correlation (r = -0.78) also 
emerges with the calendar year when the mean age at first birth among women 
increased by two years since the onset of first birth postponement (Figure 1; the 
onset of postponement is measured since the year when the period mean age at first 
birth started a long-term rise; see Sobotka 2004: 57-58). In other words, the timing 
of  the  onset  of  first  birth  postponement,  combined  with  the  initial  pace  of  this 
postponement,  can  serve  as  rather  reliable  ‘predictors’  of  SDT-related  values  in 
1999: the earlier the first birth postponement started, and the faster it subsequently 
progressed, the higher the SDT score that was reached in 1999. 
Surprisingly,  among  different  demographic  manifestations  of  the  SDT,  the 
often  emphasised  association  with  (very)  low  fertility  has  become  most 
questionable. Whereas the ‘model countries’ of the spread of the SDT values and 
behaviour,  such  as  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden,  have  experienced  a  prolonged  
 
                                                            
8 In addition, an increasing importance of immigrants for childbearing discussed in Overview Chapter 7 
may be seen as another, not initially envisioned, trait of the second demographic transition. Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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Figure 1:   Index of the second demographic transition in 1999 (index SDT2)  
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SOURCE: Own computations based on Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2008), Sobotka (2004), France and Russia 
chapters, and Halman (2001). 
 
 
period of first birth postponement and an intensive rise in the proportion of children 
born outside marriage, their period fertility rates surpass fertility in most other parts 
of Europe, and their cohort fertility remains relatively close to the replacement level 
threshold  (see  also  Overview  Chapters  1  and  4).  Several  distinct  findings  and 
arguments  that  cast  doubt  on  the  second  demographic  transition  –  low  fertility 
connection may be outlined: 
 
•  Some countries retain cohort fertility close to the replacement level. The 
most ‘notorious’ example is that of the United States, where both period 
and  completed  cohort  fertility  remain  around  this  threshold.  Lesthaeghe 
and Neidert (2006) attribute this ‘American exceptionalism’ mainly to the 
‘ethnic factor,’ namely, high fertility among Hispanic immigrants. Several 
European  countries,  including  Denmark,  France,  Norway,  and  Sweden, 
also  retain  completed  fertility  close  to  the  replacement  level  (see  also 
Overview Chapter 1). For instance, recent projection of cohort fertility in Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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France  suggests  that  the  cohorts  born  in  the  early  1970s  will  have  2.0 
children  on  average  (trend  projection  in  Prioux  2006:  351,  T.  5).  This 
finding  indicates  that  the  second  demographic  transition  does  not 
necessarily  lead  to  below-replacement  cohort  fertility  levels.  This 
argument, which I further elaborate in another publication (Sobotka 2008), 
is also reflected in several country chapters. For example, the authors of the 
chapter on France note that this country has maintained a relatively high 
level  of  fertility  in  spite  of  experiencing  many  characteristic  social  and 
demographic  changes  commonly  thought  as  conducive  to  low  fertility, 
such as delayed entry into parenthood, rising couple instability, increasing 
number of births outside marriage, or the spread of modern contraception 
(Overview Chapter 4). Similarly, the Sweden chapter mentions a puzzling 
contradiction that Sweden, which is often viewed as a forerunner of the 
second  transition,  also  “exhibits  one  of  the  highest  fertility  levels  in 
Europe, with a completed fertility close to replacement.” 
 
•  This  finding  is  also  linked  to  another  distinct  line  of  reasoning,  which 
emphasises  the  lack  of  cross-sectional  correlation  between  the  second 
demographic transition and low fertility in contemporary Europe (Coleman 
2004). In fact,  my analysis (Sobotka 2008) of cross-country association 
between  selected  behavioural  and  values  components  of  the  SDT  and 
fertility indicates that there is a positive correlation between the second 
transition and fertility in contemporary Europe. This positive association 
emerges most clearly with respect to the period total fertility rate (TFR, 
Figure  2a),  which  is  a  very  problematic  indicator  of  the  fertility  level 
(Overview Chapter 1, Lutz and Sobotka 2008), but it also holds for the 
TFR adjusted for changes in the timing of childbearing and, to a smaller 
extent, for desired family size (Sobotka 2008). In contrast, there was no 
detectable  association  between  the  SDT  index  based  on  family-related 
behaviour (SDT1 index
9) and the TFR level in 1990 for Europe as a whole 
(Figure  2b).  Only  the  group  of  ‘Western’  countries  (i.e.,  all  European 
countries  except  the  post-communist  societies  of  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe)  exhibited  as  early  as  1990  a  positive  association  between  the 
                                                            
9 The SDT1 index is constructed in analogy to the SDT2 index introduced above. It combines six 
components of family-related behaviour in 2004: mean age at first birth, mean age at first marriage, 
teenage fertility rate, proportion of non-marital births, total divorce rate, and total first marriage rate for 
women (see Appendix). To account partly for the spread of cohabitation, this index was adjusted upward 
by 0.5 for countries where cohabitating unions account for more than one-tenth of all unions (according 
to the 2001 census data assembled by Philipov 2006: 31, Table 2 and national data sources). Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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SDT1 index and fertility, an association which was also found to be strong 
in 2004. This finding potentially suffers from all the weaknesses linked to 
such a simple bivariate cross-country analysis conducted at one point of 
time, such as the danger of ecological fallacy, an ignorance of country-
specific  trajectories  over  time,  and  the  lack  of  adequate  controls  for 
important factors affecting this association. Nevertheless, it seems safe to 
conclude  that  the  recent  shift  to  low  and  very  low  fertility  in  Europe 
appears  to  be  driven  more  by  the  structural  factors  (family  and  social 
policies,  economic  trends,  employment  patterns;  see  also  Liefbroer  and 
Fokkema  2008,  Sobotka  2008,  Adsera  2004),  which  are  only  indirectly 
linked to the second demographic transition.
10 
 
•  The absence of a negative cross-sectional correlation between the second 
demographic  transition  and  desired  family  size  among  younger  women 
(Sobotka 2008) is also significant. Van de Kaa’s (2001) analysis showed 
that,  in  a  number  of  European  countries,  young  women  with  a  post-
materialist value orientation had higher family size ideals than those with 
‘materialist’  values,  whereas  fertility  intentions  did  not  differ  between 
these  two  groups.  Apparently,  the  spread  of  the  second  demographic 
transition may not lead to the spread of sub-replacement fertility intentions. 
In most of the countries that made the biggest advances along the SDT 
trajectory, the fertility desires of younger women remain at or above two, 
and  the  two-child  family  norm  continues  to  enjoy  an  uncontested 
popularity. There are countries where fertility intentions declined below the 
replacement  level  among  the  younger  cohorts  (see,  for  example,  the 
chapters on the Czech Republic, Poland, and Spain), but it remains unclear 
to what extent this is a reflection of new values, perceived obstacles to 
childbearing, or a  delay in accommodation to the previous fall in fertility 
rates.  
 
•  Finally,  some  studies  point  out  that  the  fall  in  period  fertility  rates  in 
numerous  countries  had  preceded  changes  in  the  underlying  attitudes 
towards family life and children. This is an especially common assertion in 
discussions of the former communist countries (see Section 4.2 below).  
                                                            
10 The association between the second demographic transition and fertility would become more 
convincing if it were manifested also for cohort fertility. However, the fertility level among the cohorts 
that are currently close to completing their reproductive life, i.e. those born in the late 1960s, relates to 
the periods when the SDT had not yet fully taken off in Central, Eastern, but also Southern Europe. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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Figure 2a:   Index of the second demographic transition (‘behavioural’ index  


























































Figure 2b:   Index of the second demographic transition (‘behavioural’  
























































NOTE:  See footnote 9 and the text for a definition of the SDT1 index. More details are provided in the Appendix and in Sobotka 
(2008).  
SOURCES: Own computations based on Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2008), Philipov 2006, and national statistical 
offices. Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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The surprising positive association between the second demographic transition 
and fertility can be better understood when the transition is related to fertility rates 
at younger and older childbearing ages. Specifically, the values and attitudes-based 
index SDT2 is negatively correlated with fertility rates of women below age 25, and 
positively correlated with fertility rates above age 35. This is illustrated in Figure 3, 
which looks at this association in 2000 for young-age fertility, and in 2006 for later-
age  fertility.
11  The  figure  excludes  Southern  Europe  and  Ireland,  where  this 
association was particularly weak, probably because factors other than SDT-linked 
values  and  attitudes  were  more  relevant  for  fertility  rates  at  younger  and  later 
childbearing ages. This simple analysis of the SDT-fertility link offers the following 
interpretation:  the  second  demographic  transition  leads  to  a  marked  decline  of 
fertility at younger ages (‘postponement’ component), but later becomes positively 
linked to fertility rates at higher childbearing ages (‘recuperation’ component). This 
recuperation is strong enough to bring an overall positive association between SDT 
and  fertility,  despite  some  fertility-inhibiting  effects  of  progressively  delayed 
childbearing. This association becomes clearly manifested only if and when fertility 
in the analysed countries falls to relatively low levels.      
In sum, the low and very low fertility rates in contemporary Europe stand on 
three  legs:  fertility  postponement,  which  is  a  long-lasting  trend  that  should 
eventually come to an end
12, numerous structural and institutional constraints that 
negatively influence fertility decisions of individuals, and, in some cases, a shift in 
family-size norms and desires towards sub-replacement fertility (see also Overview 
Chapter 4). While the first factor (‘postponement’) has been losing in importance in 
many of the countries that advanced the most in the SDT progression, and the third 
factor (‘sub-replacement desires’) is far from universal, it seems that the impact of 
the  second  set  of  factors  (different  ‘constraints’)  constitutes  the  most  important 
explanation for very low fertility. These factors are not central to the changes in the 
 
                                                            
11 The SDT2 index is used here because its demographic (behavioural) counterpart SDT1 includes period 
TFR that is linked with the analysed age-specific fertility rates. The selection of a later year, 2006, for a 
comparison of the SDT2 index and fertility rates at higher ages was motivated by the ‘recuperation’ 
argument: If the SDT is linked to fertility recuperation of cohorts that had postponed childbearing at 
younger ages, this link can be established only with a time lag, i.e., at the time when these cohorts 
actually reach later childbearing ages. If this argument holds, the positive association between SDT and 
late fertility may become even more apparent in the future.  
12 Recently an increasing number of countries have recorded a slowing-down or even a stopping in an 
increase of the mean age at childbearing (see also Overview Chapter 1). The Netherlands was the first 
European country where fertility postponement has, at least temporarily, come to an end in the late 1990s 
(Sobotka 2004). Consequently, there was a stabilisation of cohort fertility trajectories among women born 
in the 1970s (Frejka and Sardon 2006: 357).   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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Figure 3:   Association between the ‘attitudinal’ index of the second  
  demographic transition (SDT 2, 1999) and the sum of age-specific  
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NOTES:  See the text and the Appendix for a definition of the SDT2 index (see also Sobotka 2008). The figure includes all 
European countries that participated in the European Values Study survey of 1999, except Ireland, Southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and countries with small population size (Luxembourg and Iceland). 
SOURCES: Own computations based on Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2008), Sobotka (2004), Halman (2001), Russian 
Federation chapter, and national statistical offices. 
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values of family and children and, therefore, may not be seen as a part of the SDT 
‘package’.
13  Their  importance  may  explain  an  unexpected  outcome,  namely,  the 
current positive association between the SDT and fertility ‘recuperation’ at higher 
childbearing ages, and hence also period fertility rates. This association is consistent 
with  recent  research  by  Myrskylä,  Kohler,  and  Billari  (2008),  who  reported  a 
positive association between ‘development’ (as measured by the widely used human 
development index, HDI), and period total fertility for the countries that reached 
high levels of HDI (above 0.8).  
However, at least one aspect of low fertility – the rise in childlessness – is 
closely  linked  to  the  transition.  As  parenthood  ceases  to  be  a  ‘natural’  part  of 
individual biographies and the main goal in a woman’s life, voluntary childlessness 
becomes a broadly accepted option. This has led to a rise in the proportion of people 
who are undecided about whether they will have children later in life. Sobotka and 
Testa (2008) show that a substantial proportion of childless  men and  women in 
Europe  do  not  intend  to  have  a  child,  or  are  uncertain  about  their  parenthood 
intentions. So  far,  voluntary  childlessness has  spread  most in  western Germany, 
where  it  has  become  a  broadly  accepted  lifestyle,  and  where  childlessness, 
especially among higher-educated women, has reached the highest level in Europe 
(Germany chapter; see also Overview Chapter 2 and Sobotka 2005). The Germany 
chapter points out that there is a small group in the population that “does not regard 
children as an enrichment to life,” and for whom “children do not fit with their own 
identity” (Dorbritz 2008:590).  
 
 
4. The second demographic transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe  
4.1 Regional economic and social differentiation and the changes in family-
related behaviour after 1989 
The discussion on the diffusion of the second demographic transition in the former 
state-socialist countries of Europe is closely linked to the analysis of the factors 
responsible for rapid changes in fertility and family patterns observed in this region 
                                                            
13 However, changes in values and attitudes that take place during the second demographic transition may 
bring to the fore different structural and institutional factors that had not affected fertility decisions 
substantially in the past, when a strong normative pressure for parenthood and traditional family norms 
prevailed. Once the timing of childbearing as well as the choice of parenthood as such become more 
optional parts of individuals’ biographies, many factors that had not played an important role in the past 
emerge as powerful constraints affecting fertility.    Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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since the early 1990s (see Overview Chapter 5). A number of specific questions 
regarding the occurrence of the SDT in this region arise repeatedly: Are behavioural 
changes  since  the  early  1990s  qualitatively  comparable  to  those  that  took  place 
earlier in ‘Western’ societies? If so, are the underlying mechanisms similar as well, 
or  are  there  constraining  factors  related  to  the  political  and  economic  changes 
prominent  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe?  Do  the  typical  normative  and  value 
changes  accompany  the  changes  in  family  and  reproductive  behaviour  in  these 
countries, or do changes in norms and values ‘lag’ behind behavioural changes? 
And,  finally,  how  can  shifts  in  values  and  attitudes  that  are  typical  of  affluent 
societies take place in countries that have often been severely affected by economic 
crisis and political turmoil? Before delving deeper into any of these issues, it is 
important  to  stress  the  enormous  cultural  and  economic  diversity  of  the  region, 
which is often overlooked in broad comparative studies (Sobotka 2003, Manning 
2004). The region consists of countries that are very secularised and culturally rather 
‘liberal’  (e.g.,  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Slovenia,  the  former  GDR  or  East 
Germany,  and,  in  many  respects,  also  Hungary)  and  countries  that  are  more 
culturally conservative, where people attach higher importance to traditional family 
values, and where religion often continues to play an important role (e.g., Poland, 
Romania,  or  Slovakia).  It  also  consists  of  societies  that  are  culturally  close  to 
Western Europe, and that considered themselves part of the ‘Western world’ before 
the Second World War (e.g., the Czech Republic and the Baltic countries); and of 
countries that had been historically distinct from the ‘West’, a category that includes 
most of the predominantly Christian Orthodox and Muslim countries. Finally, the 
economic restructuring of the 1990s led to widely divergent outcomes and a vast 
differentiation in the overall economic performance and living standards, despite 
many  comparable  pathways  and  policies,  including  large-scale  economic 
privatisation, opening of the economy, and market reforms. For instance, the GDP 
per capita in US Dollars in 2005 (constant 2000 level) varied from 429 in Moldova, 
to 959 in Ukraine, 2,071 in Bulgaria, and up to 6,515 in the Czech Republic and 
11,382 in Slovenia. (World Bank 2007).
14 Keeping this diversity in mind, I review 
the evidence of the typical changes in fertility, family, and living arrangements, as 
well  as  in  values  and  attitudes  to  children,  sexuality,  and  family  life,  and 
subsequently  suggest  an  interpretation  of  the  ongoing  second  demographic 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe.  
                                                            
14 This enormous difference becomes smaller when the GDP level is adjusted for purchasing power 
parity. Then, the difference between the poorest country, Moldova, and the most affluent country, 
Slovenia, reduces to 1,908 and 22,292 US Dollars, respectively. Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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A number of country chapters provide strong evidence of massive behavioural 
changes typically associated  with the second transition.  Although  some of these 
changes started well before 1990 (Hungary chapter, Stankuniene and Maslauskaite 
2008, Hoem et al. 2007, Katus et al. 2007, Gerber and Berman 2006)
15, the period 
after 1990 has seen a rapid acceleration of all the characteristic trends: first births 
and first  marriages have been postponed (less intensively in Eastern and South-
eastern  Europe,  more  vigorously  in  Central  Europe  and  the  Baltic  countries), 
fertility levels have fallen, the percentage of non-marital births has surged, marriage 
rates  have  plummeted,  and  divorce  rates  have  remained  high,  or  have  further 
increased. Cohabitation has been spreading as well, although its significance differs 
widely across countries.
16 Whereas in many countries, cohabitation mostly retains 
the character of a ‘trial marriage,’ it has been rising fast in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Russia,  and  Slovenia;  often  becoming  a 
standard part in a partnership ‘career’ among younger cohorts (see the respective 
country chapters, Gerber and Berman 2006, Hoem et al. 2007, Katus et al. 2007, 
Spéder 2005, Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). In other countries, such as Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Ukraine, the diffusion of cohabitation has been rather slow, 
and  is  often  typical  of  people  in  disadvantaged  economic  positions  (Poland  and 
Romania chapters, Muresan 2007). In almost all countries, however, cohabitation 
has been spreading most rapidly among younger people below age 30, and it has 
increasingly  replaced  marriage  as  a  dominant  form  of  the  first  union  (Czech 
Republic and Hungary chapters, Spéder 2005, Katus et al. 2007, Hoem et al. 2007). 
In addition, the duration of cohabitation has risen over time, suggesting that it is 
gradually  becoming  a  lasting  alternative  to  marriage  (Hungary  chapter,  Spéder 
2005, Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007; see also Overview Chapter 4). 
Following  the  collapse  of  the  restrictive  state-socialist  regime  in  1989,  the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced a full-blown sexual and 
contraceptive  revolution,  bringing  a  boom  of  information  and  messages  on 
contraception, sex, and pornography (the Czech Republic chapter). This trend has 
also affected more traditional and more religious societies. For instance, in 1997, 
                                                            
15 Some behavioural features typical of the SDT have spread widely in Central and Eastern Europe 
between the 1960s and the 1980s: premarital sex, marriage instability, and, in some countries, 
cohabitation (especially among divorced and separated people), and also a one-child family model 
(especially in urban areas of Russia; see Avdeev and Monnier 1995).  
16 In several countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia, and the former GDR, cohabitation 
had already become more common during the state-socialist period. In other countries, such as Bulgaria, 
it was rather common as a very short period of living together before marriage (e.g., Philipov and 
Jasilioniene 2007), often only once the marriage has been agreed upon. Among the Roma ethnic group, 
cohabitation (or rather a marriage not officially registered with the authorities) was common prior to 
1990 for the reasons entirely unrelated to the second demographic transition (see also Bulgaria chapter).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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three-quarters of Slovak women of reproductive age were found to have a positive 
attitude  towards  premarital  sex  (Potančoková  et  al.  2008:997).  An  increasing 
acceptance of sex outside marriage is also noted in the Poland chapter. In many 
countries,  the  actual  prevalence  of  premarital  sex  had  already  become  almost 
universal during the post-war decades (the Czech Republic chapter) or increased 
rapidly after 1990: in Romania, the proportion of sexually experienced young adult 
women who began their sexual life prior to marriage rose from about one-half in 
1993 and 1996, to 77% in 1999, and to around 90% in 2004 (RHS 2005). It is 
important to emphasise, however, that a ‘stealthy’ liberalisation of sexual morals 
and behaviour started in Central and Eastern Europe well before 1990, despite the 
limited  spread  of  modern  contraception  there.  As  the  Russia  chapter  notes,  this 
sexual revolution “proceeded more quietly and less noticeably to the observer, by 
virtue of the taboo placed on the theme for research,” and also due to a general 
avoidance of this subject by the media (see also Binyon 1983). Sexual debut and 
regular sexual relations occurred at younger ages, and usually prior to marriage. In 
the absence of proper knowledge and availability of modern contraception, an early 
start of sexual life led to the surge in premarital conceptions, which gave rise to 





4.2 Factors fuelling the changes in family behaviour  
Individual  chapters  take  a  more  nuanced  view  when  discussing  the  factors 
responsible for the observed changes in family behaviour. Some of them emphasise 
the lack of evidence for a marked change in values that would progress in parallel 
with the changes in family-related behaviour, or that would precede it. The Poland 
chapter  raises  the  question  of  whether  the  transition  can  explain  family-related 
developments in Poland when “ideational change has not advanced until recently 
compared  with  its  progress  in  other  European  countries”  (Kotowska  et  al. 
2008:845). The absence of a link between behavioural and value changes in fertility 
behaviour has been similarly noted by Rotariu (2006) in the case of Romania, and 
by Gerber and Cottrell (2006) in the case of Russia. The Romania chapter suggests 
that both ‘post-modern’ and conservative values have been advancing there: people 
                                                            
17 It is remarkable that the officially published advice literature on partnerships, sexuality, and family 
often provided very little practical information on sex and contraception. Potančoková (2007) shows that 
in Czechoslovakia this literature often portrayed contraception and pre-marital sexual relations as 
problematic, and even linked contraceptive use with promiscuity. Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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started  to  “adopt  Western  values  and  to  imitate  modern  and  post-modern 
behaviour,” but, at the same time, material insecurity enhanced the importance of 
traditional values and favoured “conservative behaviour” (Muresan et al. 2008:895). 
In the absence of strong evidence of ideational changes, several chapters stress the 
importance of structural factors for initiating the change in family behaviour (e.g., 
the Bulgaria, Poland, and Ukraine chapters). The Ukraine chapter suggests that “the 
new trends may be the result of economic or cultural factors that have little to do 
with a shift towards SDT” (Perelli-Harris 2008:1165). Gerber and Cottrell (2006) 
posit  that,  despite  the  rapid  increase  in  the  proportion  of  non-marital  births  in 
Russia,  there  is  a  continuing  traditionalism  towards  fertility  (but  not  towards 
marriage,  see  Gerber  and  Berman  2006),  and  no  clear  evidence  of  a  greater 
tolerance of extramarital childbearing. In contrast, the Hungary chapter points out 
that  specific  changes  in  values  affecting  family  life,  such  as  rise  in  consumer 
aspirations and social atomisation, had taken place during the period preceding the 
change of political regime in 1989. The Czech Republic chapter, on the other hand, 
emphasises the abrupt and multifaceted nature of social change after 1989, which 
makes it impossible to separate the contribution of different economic, structural, 
and cultural factors to fertility changes.
18 
Three  distinct  findings  support  the  idea  that  long-lasting  changes  in  both 
family-related values and behaviour are reinforcing each other. First, both country-
level evidence, as well as the research on household positions and value orientations 
in Central and Eastern Europe, show that, as is the case in ‘Western’ countries, there 
is  a  consistent  relationship  between  changes  in  family  behaviour  and  value 
orientations. Countries that have made greater progress on the SDT dimension also 
exhibit most clearly values and attitudes typical of the SDT (see also Section 4.5 
and Figure 4 below). The profiles of ‘non-traditional’ value orientation are closely 
patterned by the living arrangements in which individuals live, with those who are 
divorced or who had ever cohabited displaying the most ‘non-conformist’ values, 
both in post-communist countries and in other regions of Europe (Lesthaeghe and 
Surkyn 2002). Second, as the Russian Federation chapter points out, the end of the 
economic crisis and an improvement in living conditions beginning in 1999 did not 
bring any signs of return to the previous pattern of family behaviour. Rather, very 
low  fertility  levels  persisted,  and  the  trend  towards  delayed  family  formation, 
decline in marriage, and the rise in cohabitation continued (see also Gerber and 
Cottrell 2006). Similar evidence for other countries casts doubt on the validity of the 
                                                            
18 Because of the emphasis on different sets of values and attitudes in various country chapters, and also 
due to a lack of comparable surveys on family-related values prior to 1990, these evaluations of 
ideational changes in individual countries are to a large extent subjective.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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‘economic crisis’ explanation of the intensive demographic changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe after 1989 (see Overview Chapter 5 and Russia chapter). Finally, 
there  are  signs  of  a  transformation  in  values  and  attitudes  towards  family  and 
children, and the spread of individualism across the whole region, especially among 
the  younger,  better-educated,  and  urban  populations.  Lesthaeghe’s  and  Surkyn’s 
(2002: Table 6.7.2) analysis of European Values Study surveys in 1990 and 1999 
shows  that  some  of  the  family-related  attitudes  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
moved in the expected direction envisioned by the SDT concept (while some other 
attitudes, especially acceptability of divorce and adultery, remained rather stable). 
This shift has been particularly notable in the Czech Republic, where the majority of 
people have become highly tolerant of abortion, premarital sex, divorce, or same-
sex partnerships (Sobotka, Zeman, and Kantorová 2003 and the Czech Republic 
chapter). The Lithuania chapter suggests that Lithuanians have been “absorbing and 
adopting  the  life  styles,  value  orientations,  and  norms  of  behaviour”  typical  of 
Western  European  societies  (Stankuniene  and  Jasilioniene  2008:706;  see  also 
Bulgaria chapter). The Poland chapter has noted that younger generations are “less 
altruistic,  more inclined to strive for self-fulfilment and appreciation outside the 
family,” and they attach less importance to family life and children (Kotowska et al. 
2008:837).  Several chapters emphasise that the ‘value change’ explanation best fits 
the  highly  educated  group  of  the  younger  population  (Romania  and  Ukraine 
chapters; see also below). 
How can we reconcile the somewhat conflicting evidence on the progression of 
the second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe? As proposed by 
de Beer, Corijn, and Deven (2000), there indeed seems to be more than one model 
of  the  transition.  Moreover,  given  the  complexity  and  the  fluidity  of  the  SDT 
narrative,  the  assessment  of  its  progression  as  reflected  in  individual  country 
chapters is necessarily rather subjective. The ‘Central-Eastern European’ model of 
the  transition  is  as  diverse  as  the  post-communist  societies  and  their  cultural 
heritage. Nevertheless, several shared features in their SDT may be outlined: 
 
1)  Late occurrence of many of the behavioural and value changes typical of 
the transition, especially those related to alternative living arrangements; 
2)  Rapidity with which many features of this transition emerged during the 
1990s; 
3)  The importance of structural and economic factors, especially in the early 
stage of the transition; and 
4)  The importance of disadvantaged social groups in the spread of some of the 
new types of family behaviour, especially non-marital childbearing and, in 
many cases, unmarried cohabitation. 
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4.3 Explaining the peculiar progression of the SDT using the Readiness – 
Willingness – Ability framework   
To get a better understanding of the peculiar and, at times, puzzling progression of 
the SDT in Central and Eastern Europe, I adopt a conceptual model proposed by 
Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001), which elaborates on an idea first put forward 
by Coale (1973).
19 This model, called RWA (an acronym for Ready, Willing, and 
Able), is built around the idea that widespread behavioural change occurs only if 
three different preconditions are simultaneously met. ‘Readiness’ (R) reflects the 
‘cost-benefit  calculation,’  namely,  the  economic,  social,  and  psychological 
advantages of adopting a new behaviour. ‘Willingness’ (W) refers to the cultural and 
ethical acceptability, and thus also the legitimacy of the new form of behaviour. 
Finally, the ‘ability’ (A) refers to the technical or legal means that enable individuals 
to adopt new behaviour. The attractiveness of this model lies in its recognition of 
the joint importance of economic/structural factors (R), norms, values, and attitudes 
(W),  as  well  as  technology  and  legal  regulation  (A).  This  makes  it  particularly 
appropriate  for  understanding  recent  shifts  in  fertility  and  family  behaviour  in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
The  RWA  scheme  makes  it  possible  to  outline  the  factors  that  had  been 
conducive to the SDT, and that had already spread in the state-socialist countries 
between the 1950s and the 1980s, as well as the factors that had prevented the onset 
of  a  full-blown  second  demographic  transition  prior  to  1990.  With  respect  to 
readiness, the creation of a relatively broad social security net during the decades 
following the Second World War had diminished in many countries the economic 
consequences  for  women  of  divorce  or  single  motherhood.  Similarly,  the  shift 
towards  an  almost  universal  employment  of  women  enhanced  their  economic 
position, and reduced their dependence on male partners and relatives. On the other 
hand, the stalled expansion of tertiary education, the lack of alternatives for self-
realisation outside the family, as well as the peculiar system of preferential housing 
distribution  to  married  couples  with  children,  discouraged  cohabitation  and  
supported  early  marriage  and  childbearing  (see  also  Overview  Chapter  4  and 
Chapter 8 in Sobotka 2004). Women’s emancipation had stalled halfway between 
tradition and modernity. On the one hand, women gained similar levels of education 
as men, they were entitled—and even pressed
20— to participate in paid labour, and 
                                                            
19  Most recently, Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn (2006) have used this model to explain spatial 
differences in the second demographic transition in the United States.  
20 This pressure for employment was circumstantial, motivated by ‘financial necessity,’ as one income 
could not secure a decent standard of living in the families, but also ideologically motivated (the 
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their economic activity was “ideologically supported by equating emancipation with 
employment” (Kotowska et al. 2008:825). On the other hand, they were confronted 
with very traditional norms and expectations about their family and childrearing 
roles, and they were expected to take care of the household, shopping, cleaning, 
cooking,  and  childcare.  Despite  gaining  more  economic  independence,  women 
frequently  worked  in  low-pay  occupations  (Bulgaria  chapter)  and  they  faced 
multiple burdens that were a far cry from the ideas of gender equality and ‘women’s 
liberation.’ Family life became highly idealised. Family relationships enhanced the 
well-being of individuals, as the mutual help of family members substituted for a 
deficient service economy (the Czech Republic and Hungary chapters). Moreover, 
family life provided a “shelter from the politicised public scene” (Potančoková et al. 
2008:1001), and from the omnipresent eyes of the state (see also Sobotka 2004).  
Concerning  willingness, the  official Communist ideology  was strongly anti-
religious, and thus helped to erode some of traditional norms related to marriage, 
family, and sexuality, which had previously been anchored in religious teachings. 
The destruction of various religious and civic organisations led to an ‘atomisation’ 
of  the  society  (Hungary  chapter).  Despite  the  shortage  of  consumer  goods, 
consumerist orientation had spread well before 1990 (Spéder 2005; Sobotka 2004). 
Moreover, even the media censorship and the limits placed on travel to ‘Western’ 
countries were not sufficient obstacles against the spread of new fashions, ideas, and 
aspirations associated with ‘Western’ culture, often progressing in a rather bizarre 
and  deformed  way.
21  However,  the  new  values  were  embraced  in  a  selective 
fashion. Even the relatively ‘conservative’ official ideology supporting traditional 
family values could not prevent the stealthy progress of the sexual revolution and 
the increase in family instability. At the same time, official ‘puritanism’ related to 
sexuality,  gender  roles,  and  the  family  probably  helped  to  preserve  the 
overwhelmingly positive image of marriage, childbearing, and family life, as well as 
widespread  negative  attitudes  to  feminism,  homosexuality,  and  extramarital 
childbearing.  This  led  to  the  development  of  a  special  form  of  secularised  and 
pragmatic  familism:  family  was  of  a  paramount  importance  to  individuals,  but 
family dissolution through divorce or separation was increasingly accepted. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
‘emancipation’ argument), and economically motivated by the permanent  shortage of labour in an 
ineffectively organised economy (e.g., Poland chapter). 
21 The spread of ‘Western’ culture can be best illustrated by a widespread adoration of ‘Western’ pop 
music and fashion among teenagers and young adults. In Russia, for instance, teenagers were willing to 
invest enormous amount of money to obtain a pair of jeans that were neither produced in state-socialist 
countries, nor available in ordinary shops (Binyon 1983). Jeans thus constituted a powerful symbol of 
‘Western’ fashion and affluence, and jeans ownership gave teenagers higher status among their peers.  Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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The picture is similarly mixed with respect to the ability dimension. On the one 
hand, legislative changes enabled some of the family changes typical of the SDT, 
for example, through relatively good access to divorce, and a wide availability of 
abortion  in  most  state-socialist  countries.  At  the  same  time,  the  widespread 
reluctance  towards  the  production  and  distribution  of  the  contraceptive  pill, 
combined with a discouragement of abortion among childless young women (often 
explained on the grounds of the potential pregnancy complications later in life), and 
a lack of comprehensive education on sexuality and contraception, helped to sustain 
a pattern of early pregnancies and shotgun marriages, and of overall higher fertility 
due to unwanted and mistimed pregnancies. 
On  balance,  the  peculiar  combination  of  the  R-W-A  factors  during  state 
socialism helps to explain why some types of family-related changes, such as an 
increase in divorce, had spread rapidly in many countries, while other behaviours 
typical of the SDT could not spread much because at least one factor of the R-W-A 
dimension acted as a bottleneck, preventing the diffusion of the new behaviour. For 
example, a combination of preferential housing distribution and special marriage 
loans (R dimension), the strong persistence of norms supporting traditional family 
(W dimension), and the low access to modern contraception, especially the pill (A 
dimension) helped to sustain an early and almost universal pattern of first marriage 
and first birth, with a pronounced peak among women in their late teens and early 
twenties. 
A specific combination of R-W-A factors in Central and Eastern Europe prior to 
1990  also  affected  the  changes  in  family  behaviour  after  the  collapse  of 
communism. The early erosion of some traditional norms related to the family helps 
to explain why the new demographic trends have spread with such intensity after the 
breakdown of the state-socialist system.
22 In an environment in which traditional 
norms  had  diminished,  and  the  more  recent  communist  ideology  had  been 
discredited, there was relatively little resistance to forms of behaviour that would 
have  been  deemed  inappropriate  in  more  traditional  settings.  Philipov  (2003) 
stresses the importance of discontinuity and the resulting disorientation and anomie 
(normlessness)  after  the  regime  change  around  1990.  The  lack  of  generally 
recognised norms of behaviour supported the diffusion of the less stable forms of 
partnership,  and  the  postponement  of  union  formation  and  parenthood  (see  also 
Bulgaria chapter). These factors explain why the W dimension did not constitute a 
                                                            
22 It should be noted, however, that the official Communist ideology gradually espoused a rather 
conservative model of the family, pursuing the idea of parental ‘duty’ and the responsibility of women to 
the society to bear children. Paradoxically, this ideology has in some instances developed into a morality 
similar to the orthodox teachings of the Catholic Church (Ferge 1997).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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strong barrier to the spread of many new forms of behaviour. As was the case in 
Western and Northern Europe, many ‘traditional’ family norms had already eroded 
or had diminished in importance during the decades following the Second World 
War, or their importance had weakened significantly during the turbulent period of 
the  late  1980s  and  the  early  1990s.
23  In  this  environment,  many  people  openly 
embraced values and living standards characteristic of Western European countries 
(see also below). 
 
 
4.4 Emerging cultural and family divides in Central and Eastern Europe  
A new family divide has (re-)emerged among post-communist countries after 1990, 
reflecting  varying  degrees  of  secularisation,  modernisation,  and  traditionalism 
(especially in countries with a predominantly Roman Catholic tradition), as well as 
historical regional divisions (e.g., Fux 2008).
24 These differences appear to have a 
lasting impact on the progression of the second demographic transition, and, more 
generally, on demographic patterns there. Selected chapters express a contrasting 
evaluation of the importance of religion, and the reputation enjoyed by religious 
authorities in the respective countries. On the one hand, a majority of the population 
in  Romania  believes  that  the  (Orthodox)  church  provides  the  “right  answers  to 
family issues” (Muresan et al. 2008:895), the Catholic Church in Poland continues 
to enjoy “the highest ranks of social trust” (Kotowska et al. 2008:838), and the 
Catholic Church in Slovakia “plays an important role in the  society and  has an 
influence on reproductive behaviour” (Potančoková et al. 2008:1007). On the other 
hand,  in  Slovenia,  the  “position  of  the  [Catholic]  Church  and  the  clergy  on  the 
confidence scale is low” (Stropnik and Šircelj 2008:1039)  and religious affiliation, 
church attendance and the support of traditional religion are at very low levels in the 
Czech Republic (Sobotka et al. 2008:436; see also Stankuniene and Maslauskaite 
2008). On an individual level, religiosity still exerts a substantial impact on the 
attitudes to marriage and childbearing. Less religious people in Europe tend to reject 
                                                            
23 Unfortunately, very little comparable data exist on family-related values and attitudes in Central and 
Eastern Europe during the state-socialist era. Thus, most of the literature on changes in values and 
attitudes in this region take the early 1990s as a starting point, often implicitly assuming that the surveys 
conducted in the early 1990s also provide a portrait of values prevalent before the collapse of state 
socialism.  
24 Fux (2008) discusses the links between historically dominant religious traditions, developments of 
welfare state, modernisation, and differentiation in demographic behaviour in Europe. His study is one of 
the few that address emerging differences in welfare regimes and family patterns in Central and Eastern 
Europe.   Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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the benefits and exclusivity  of marriage as a form of partnership (Pongrácz and 
Spéder  2008),  and  consider  children  less  essential  to  their  lives  (Fokkema  and 
Esveld 2008).  
On  a  country  level,  the  prevalence  of  different  family  trajectories  can  be 
interpreted in conjunction with different levels of secularisation. Stankuniene and 
Maslauskaite  (2008),  while  cautioning  against  simply  equating  religiosity  with 
‘conservative’ attitudes towards family changes, also attribute the huge differences 
in the acceptance of the changes in family formation in Central and Eastern Europe 
to  a  combination  of  the  early  onset  of  these  changes,  and  different  levels  of 
individualisation and secularisation. Among the six societies analysed, respondents 
were  found  to  evaluate  selected  family  changes  most  positively  in  highly 
individualised, secularised and non-Catholic East Germany, and, to a lesser extent, 
in  the  strongly  secularised  Czech  Republic.  On  the  other  hand,  respondents  in 
religious  and  conservative  Polish  society  assessed  recent  changes  in  family 
formation most negatively. The correlation between religiosity and family behaviour 
is often clearly detectable on a regional level. In the Czech Republic, for example, 
the proportion of people who declare their religious affiliation is negatively linked 
to the proportion of extramarital births on a district level (Czech Republic chapter). 
Thus, the new family behaviour spreads most intensively in the most secularised 
regions, where it meets little resistance. In the more religious regions, church and 
other moral authorities, as well as a significant portion of the population, oppose the 
new family behaviour. In these countries, the W factor may constitute a bottleneck 
that slows down the spread of the second demographic transition.
25 
With a general decline in the importance of the willingness dimension before 
1990,  the  readiness  factor  increased  in  prominence.  A  number  of  chapters 
emphasise the role of economic and structural constraints as the main driving forces 
of  the  SDT  behaviour  among  post-communist  countries  during  the  1990s  (e.g., 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine chapters). Although the initial spread of 
rapid  behavioural  changes  was  indeed  primarily  facilitated  by  structural  and 
economic  factors  in  many  societies,  these  shifts  have  in  part  rested  on  peculiar 
‘atomisation’  of  society  progressing  before  1990  (Hungary  chapter).  Emerging 
                                                            
25 Two countries positioned on the western side of the former Soviet Bloc, the Czech Republic and 
Poland, illustrate this point. In the secularised Czech Republic, cohabitation and non-marital childbearing 
have spread rapidly after the regime change in 1989, births and marriages have been postponed 
massively, the divorce rate has further increased, the contraceptive pill soon became the dominant means 
of birth control, and, since 2006, homosexual couples may register their partnerships (the Czech Republic 
chapter). In contrast, in Poland, which remains a highly religious society where the Catholic Church 
retains considerable influence, abortions were severely restricted since 1993, the use of the contraceptive 
pill has only spread gradually, cohabitation remains relatively marginal, and acceptance of cohabitation is 
lower than in most other countries (Poland chapter).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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changes in family behaviour have in turn greatly contributed to the rising acceptance 
and popularity of the new partnership and family forms (thus leading to a further 
decline  in  the  importance  of  W  dimension).  Consequently,  even  when  many 
constraints  typical  of  the  transition  era  diminished,  the  new  trends  had  become 
firmly established, and were preferred, or were at least accepted, by a majority of 
young people. As Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002: 215) posited, “[R]ather than the 
economic crisis per se, it is the entire restructuring of society that is the accelerator 
of  the  ideational  and  demographic  changes.”  This  argument  suggests  that  the 
distribution of the R dimension has shifted in favour of the new family behaviour, 
marked  by  delayed  family  formation,  rising  popularity  of  less  stable  types  of 
partnerships, rising numbers of childless individuals and one-child families, and the 
decline  in  the  importance  of  marriage.  The  disappearance  of  specific  factors 
sustaining the early and almost universal pattern of childbearing and marriage (e.g., 
the  system  of  preferential  housing  distribution  and  pronatalist  policies),  together 
with the emergence of many new structural factors favouring late family formation 
and less traditional living arrangements (e.g., an expansion of tertiary education, 
delayed home leaving, rapid rise of economic uncertainty in early adulthood, and 
low availability of housing), have shifted the cost-benefit calculation in favour of 
the less traditional family behaviour typical of the second demographic transition. 
As Overview Chapter 5 argues, this shift is long-lasting and cannot be explained by 
a  temporary  economic  crisis  in  the  early  1990s;  rather,  it  is  consistent  with  the 
whole transition towards a market economy and adoption of democratic institutions. 
An additional important element further reinforcing the diffusion of the new family 
patterns was a conscious adoption and imitation of ‘Western’ lifestyles and social 
norms, facilitated partly by the belief that such norms are intrinsically linked to 
modern life and the economic affluence typical of Western and Northern Europe 
(Thornton and Philipov 2007).
26 An increasingly common experience of working or 
studying abroad has further supported the diffusion of new values and lifestyles 
among the younger population. 
As  for  the  ability  dimension,  the  rapid  spread  of  modern  contraception, 
especially the pill (see Overview Chapter 3 and some country-specific chapters) has 
further facilitated the delay of family formation and the rise of cohabitation and 
other non-traditional living arrangements. Teenagers and young adults are also far 
                                                            
26 Using the example of Albania, writer Slavenka Drakulić (1996: 56) notes  the crucial role of foreign 
TV channels, which were frequently received through satellite dishes, in transmitting idealised images of 
the life in the ‘West’ to a population that has never travelled outside the country: “This is where the 
vision of the future life came from, as well as the idea of what revolution is all about: it should bring not 
only a change in political power, but also better standard of living.”   Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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better  informed  and  educated  about  contraception  and  sexuality  than  their  older 
counterparts growing up in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
 
4.5 Diversity in the second demographic transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Overall, the huge differences between Central and Eastern European countries in the 
current  spread  and  acceptance  of  SDT  behaviours,  and  of  ‘post-modern’  value 
orientations, can be explained by a combination of many factors, of which the level 
of  secularisation,  the  actual  welfare  and  family  policies,  and  historical  family 
patterns appear to be most important. Economic prosperity and affluence are also 
among the obvious candidates for explaining the cross-country differences in the 
spread of the SDT. Individualistic values of self-expression and self-fulfilment can 
thrive only in societies where people experience sufficiently high levels of affluence 
so that they do not need to worry much about the satisfaction of their basic needs. 
Finally, the importance of history cannot be overstated. In several Central European 
countries,  ‘history’  may  be  seen  as  a  factor  explaining  the  ‘return’  to  the  late 
marriage, late childbearing, and higher childlessness pattern, typical in the past of 
the  populations  positioned  to  the  west  of  Hajnal’s  (1965)  line  running  between 
Trieste and St. Petersburg. Such a ‘return’ to the previous (‘Western’) demographic 
patterns  has  been  mentioned  by  Možný  and  Katrňák  (2005)  as  an  important 
explanation of demographic changes in the Czech Republic. The breakdown of the 
‘Eastern  Bloc’  has  led  to  an  emergence  of  new  regional  demographic  divides 
(Sobotka 2003), some of which may lead to a reappearance of historical cleavages 
across Europe (e.g., Fux 2008). But ‘history’ may also refer to the influence of 
cultural changes and policies during communism. For instance, Salles (2006) has 
argued that the policies enacted to help lone mothers, but also to promote marriage 
in East Germany since the 1970s, eventually had a negative effect on marriage in the 
long run: “East German family policy instrumentalized marriage and stripped it of 
all the appeal once the associated material advantages were withdrawn. The family 
policy of the GDR thus played a key part in weakening of the role of marriage in the 
family and in East German society” (Salles 2006: 149).   
Commenting  on  the  pervasive  character  of  changes  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2004: 10) concluded that the SDT is emerging 
there “as a feature that is here to stay, just as in the West. Once more it is emerging 
as a salient characteristic of capitalist economies and of cultures that recognize the 
primacy of individual autonomy and that develop the higher order needs.” While the 
findings  on  behavioural  trends—and,  to  some  extent,  also  on  value  changes—Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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generally  support  this  view,  it  is  also  important  to  reiterate  vast  cross-country 
differences in the progress of the SDT in this region, and the complexity of different 
structural and cultural factors fuelling changes in family behaviour (see also the 
concluding  section).  Figure  4,  showing  the  score  of  selected  behavioural 
components  of  the  SDT  (SDT1  index),  as  well  as  the  attitudinal  and  values 
components  of  the  SDT  (SDT2  index)  in  29  European  countries,  show  that  the 
differences in the second demographic transition between post-communist countries 
of Europe have become large enough to blur any clear distinction between the ‘East’ 
of Europe and the other European regions (see  Appendix and Section 3  for the 
definition  of  SDT  indexes).  Whereas  some  post-communist  societies  reach  the 
lowest  SDT  score  with  respect  to  the  behavioural  component  (Romania  and 
Belarus) and the values component (especially Poland and Latvia), three central 
European  societies  (Estonia,  Hungary,  and  the  Czech  Republic)  occupy  an 
intermediate  position,  while  Slovenia  scores  high  on  both  the  behavioural  and 
values component of the SDT. In contrast with this diversity, the clustering of the 
Nordic countries, German-speaking countries (only data for Austria and Germany 
are available), and Southern and Western European countries is considerably more 
compact,  broadly  corresponding  to  welfare  state  typology  developed  by  Esping-
Andersen  (1990;  see  also  Liefbroer  and  Fokkema  2008).  Remarkably,  the 
behavioural and the values factors are strongly correlated, suggesting that, in line 
with  the  theoretical  arguments,  changes  in  family  and  reproductive  behaviour 
progress hand in glove with the characteristic changes in values and attitudes in 
practically all the countries in which the second demographic transition emerges. 
 
 
5. Social status differences in behavioural and value changes 
typical of the transition  
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1998) stress the importance of education for the spread of 
post-materialist values that form an essential component of the second demographic 
transition. Education, when perceived as a proxy for cultural endowment, is linked 
to non-conformism, decline of traditional religious beliefs, higher permissiveness in 
personal matters (such as homosexuality or abortion), openness about sexuality, and 
high values placed on personal self-fulfilment from work (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
1998: 18). Some earlier studies, especially those conducted in the Low Countries, 
provided strong support for the idea that highly educated individuals have been the 
forerunners in the values and behaviour associated with the transition. De Feijter 
(1991) showed that, alongside age and religious affiliation, having a high level of  
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Figure 4:   Behavioural (SDT1) and values (SDT2) components of the  
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NOTES: A brief description of the SDT indexes is provided in Appendix; see also Section 3 and Sobotka (2008).  
SOURCES: Own computations based on vital statistics data in 2004 for the SDT1 index (Council of Europe 2006 and Eurostat 
2006) and the data from the European Values Study in 1999-2000 for the SDT2 index (Halman 2001). 
 
 
education  was  a  powerful  determinant  of  more  liberal  attitudes  towards 
cohabitation,  sexuality,  and  parenthood  in  the  Netherlands.  Cohabitation  and 
voluntary  childlessness  there  were  initially  most  typical  of  women  with  higher 
levels  of  education.  These  findings  conformed  well  to  the  ‘classic’  theories  of 
cultural innovation, whereby higher-educated and economically advantaged social 
strata first adopt a new behaviour, which subsequently spreads through ‘imitation’ 
to other social groups (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). Contemporary research 
documents wide and often increasing social status heterogeneity in the timing and 
trajectories of parenthood, union formation and family life (see England and Wales 
chapter). These trajectories do not, however, always follow a predictable pattern. 
One  paradox,  discussed  below,  appears  puzzling:  while,  as  expected,  the  lower-
educated individuals display more ‘traditional’ or ‘conservative’ values, they are 
often the early adopters in the spread of cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and 
unstable  living  arrangements.  This  is  especially  true  in  the  case  of  the  post-
communist countries of Europe. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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If the concept of the second demographic transition is understood as predicting 
greater  diversity  in  individual  behaviour  as  a  result  of  increased  freedom  from 
traditional  norms  and  constraints,  then  such  diversity  is  closely  following 
educational lines. The connection between different events that typically took place 
in young adulthood (finishing education, leaving home, entering first job, marrying, 
and having a first child) has weakened considerably in the Western countries among 
the post-1950 cohorts. Consequently, a “large majority of individuals do not follow 
the ‘normal’ succession of events and ages” (Bourdelais and Gordon 2006: 257). 
Among younger cohorts higher education implies a progressive delay of most early 
life  transitions,  especially  of  parenthood,  while  lower-educated  women  often 
become parents as teenagers (chapters on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and 
Ukraine;  see  also  McLanahan  2004).  In  addition,  highly  educated  women  still 
frequently  follow  the  normatively  preferred  path  to  childbearing,  marked  by  the 
succession of school graduation, work, marriage, and first birth. In contrast, women 
with lower levels of education often “go through shorter routes to motherhood,” 
frequently  ‘bypassing’ regular  work and  marriage (Ravanera and Rajulton 2004: 
11).  
In  most  countries,  ultimate  family  size  and  childlessness  are  also  clearly 
differentiated by education, with higher-educated women having the highest levels 
of childlessness and the lowest levels of fertility.
27 This pattern is most pronounced 
in countries where career attachment, which is stronger among the higher-educated 
women, is incompatible with motherhood due to lack of childcare facilities, low 
level of labour flexibility, low gender equality within the family, or the prevailing 
normative pressure on mothers to interrupt their work career. The work-childrearing 
incompatibility, as well as an institutionalised pattern of an extended withdrawal 
from work among mothers of small children, are frequently cited as the reasons for 
particularly  high childlessness among  university-educated  women in  Austria and 
Germany (see the respective country chapters). In contrast, in countries where the 
‘motherhood penalty’ is less pronounced, there are smaller or narrowing educational 
differentials in childlessness and family size (France and Sweden chapter; see also 
Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002).
28 In France, childlessness is somewhat higher among the 
more educated women, but once they become mothers they are more likely to have 
three children than women of medium educational levels (France chapter). In sum, 
there seems to be a consistent pattern of fertility differentials by education, which 
                                                            
27 In contrast to women, highly educated men frequently have the lowest level of ultimate childlessness 
(Sweden chapter). 
28 The Sweden chapter also emphasizes the importance of the field of education, which has a greater 
impact on fertility than the level of education or the length of education (Hoem, Neyer and Andersson 
2006). Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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are conditional on entering parenthood: the structural and cultural incompatibility of 
childbearing  and  pursuing  a  career  usually  leads  to  pronounced  education 
differentials in fertility that are typically attributable to higher childlessness among 
the more educated women. Once they have their first child, higher-educated women 
usually display equally high, or even higher, progression rates to second and third 
births than their less-educated counterparts (e.g., Neels 2006 for Flanders; Rendall 
and Smallwood 2003 for England and Wales).  
Data on fertility intentions suggest that the gap in intended fertility between the 
higher- and the lower-educated women might become narrower among the 1970s 
cohorts (see de Graaf and van Duin 2007 for the Netherlands). When controlling for 
factors like partnership and employment status, and the partner’s characteristics, the 
association of higher levels of education with lower fertility intentions disappears 
altogether: van Peer and Rabušic (2008) have found that highly educated people in 
Europe desire a larger family size. Similarly, Sobotka and Testa (2008) show that, 
net  of  selected  factors
29,  an  intention  to  remain  childless  is  expressed  most 
frequently by the lower-educated women.  
In  line  with  Lesthaeghe  and  Surkyn’s  (1998)  argument,  individuals  with  a 
higher level of education usually display higher acceptance of non-traditional family 
forms. For instance, Pongrácz and Spéder (2008) show that the attitudes towards 
unmarried unions are most positive among highly educated men and women, and 
Fokkema and Esveldt (2008) find that the value attached to children declines with 
the level of education. For the United States, Pagnini and Rindfuss (1993) found 
that  better-educated  women  were  more  tolerant  toward  non-marital  childbearing 
when responding to three different questions related to it.  Several chapters in this 
collection,  especially  those  on  the  more  ‘conservative’  societies  of  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe,  suggest  that  young,  urban,  and  better-educated  people  have 
developed more positive attitudes towards cohabitation and ‘alternative lifestyles’ 
(Poland  and  Romania  chapters),  have  embraced  individualistic  values  (Lithuania 
chapter), and spearheaded fertility postponement (Slovakia and Ukraine chapters).  
The  role of  education  in  the  spread  of  cohabitation  differs  greatly  between 
countries.  Historically,  cohabitation  in  Europe  had  been  practised  especially  by 
working-class  people  and  by  the  poor  (Kiernan  2004).  More  recently,  some 
countries have seen cohabitation spreading as a new lifestyle, especially among the 
highly  educated,  and  later  being  adopted  by  the  lower-educated  couples.
30  This 
                                                            
29 The model controls for the following factors: Partnership status, employment, religiosity, attitudes 
towards children, preferred living arrangement, and partner’s employment and educational level.  
30 Kalmijn’s (2007) cross-country analysis of cohabitation, marriage, and divorce in Europe in the 1990s 
found a positive effect of tertiary education on cohabitation, but, at the same time, also on marriage rates. 
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pattern of a modern diffusion of cohabitation, documented for the Netherlands (de 
Feijter 1991), England and Wales (England and Wales chapter), Italy (Rosina and 
Fraboni 2004), and Spain (Baizán, Aasve, and Billari 2003), supports the notion of 
highly educated individuals as open-minded forerunners heralding the changes in 
family  formation.
31  However,  in  a  number  of  other  societies,  cohabitation  had 
initially spread among the less-educated and economically disadvantaged people. In 
Sweden, cohabitation has spread first in the working-class environment, rather than 
as a ‘campus movement’ (Hoem 1986). In the United States, cohabitation had been 
historically most common among the lower-educated (Bumpass and Sweet 1989), 
and in the 1980s and the 1990s it still remained more prevalent among women who 
had not completed high school (Bumpass and Lu 2000).
32 Similarly, in a number of 
Central  and  Eastern  European  societies,  cohabitation  had  initially  proliferated 
among the lower-educated, particularly after divorce (see Spéder 2005 for Hungary 
and  Romania  chapter).  This  pattern  was  also  evidenced  for  Bulgaria,  where, 
according to the Bulgaria chapter, cohabitation had spread in the 1990s as an an 
arrangement without a long commitment, especially among lower-educated women, 
who typically have disadvantaged occupational and earning status, and are thus less 
attractive  on  the  marriage  market  (Koytcheva  and  Philipov  2008:377).  Such 
diversity in the spread of cohabitation can be partly explained by the diversity of 
cohabitation as a living arrangement (see Overview  Chapter 4). A cross-country 
comparison of divorce by Härkönen and Donkers (2006) shows that divorce rates 
among women are also not systematically patterned by education. Whereas nine out 
of 17 analysed countries did not have a significant education gradient of divorce, 
five countries (France, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain) had higher divorce rates 
among higher-educated women, whereas three countries (Austria, Lithuania, and the 
United  States)  had  higher  divorce  propensity  among  lower-educated  women.  In 
addition,  higher  prevalence  of  divorce  and  non-traditional  family  behaviour 
(cohabitation and extramarital births) was associated with a shift towards a negative 
educational gradient.   
Whereas the role of higher levels of education in the diffusion of cohabitation 
and prevalence of divorce differs across countries, the evidence on the spread of 
non-marital childbearing and lone motherhood, in particular, is relatively uniform: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
This suggests that educational expansion may be positively linked to the diffusion of cohabitation, but 
does not necessarily lead to a decline in the popularity of marriage.   
31 Rosina and Fraboni (2004) have also detected a strong significant effect of father’s education on a 
young woman’s propensity to enter cohabitation before marriage (model based on data for Northern and 
Central regions of Italy).  
32 However, in line with the SDT arguments cohabitation in the U.S. is also linked to less traditional 
value orientation. It is more typical of people who are “slightly more liberal, less religious, and more 
supportive of egalitarian gender roles and nontraditional family” (Smock 2000: 4). Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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highly educated women have the highest propensity to marry before childbearing, 
and therefore have the lowest ratio of extramarital births. Even in a country like 
Sweden,  where  cohabitation  has  become  almost  indistinguishable  from  marriage 
(Heuveline and Timberlake 2004), and where more than half of all births take place 
outside marriage, women and men with a university degree have the highest rates of 
marriage (Bracher and Santow 1998). This finding holds irrespective of whether 
they are cohabiting or not, although the latter case – direct marriage – is rather 
unusual there (Sweden chapter). The association of low educational levels with a 
high frequency of extramarital childbearing is illustrated in Table 1 with data from 
selected countries of Central Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland). Except in Austria, the educational gradient is very steep: for women with 
the  lowest  levels  of  education,  non-marital  childbearing  has  become  a  common 
experience and the percentage of out-of-wedlock births among this group exceeds 
by a factor of 5-10 the share among university-educated women. In Austria, where 
unmarried parenthood has a long tradition in many Alpine regions (Austria chapter), 
this educational gradient is only moderate, and women who achieved only a primary 
level  of  education  have  a  below-average  percentage  of  extramarital  births.  This 
finding  is  attributable  to  a  high  proportion  of  immigrant  women  with  more 
traditional and religious background among the lowest-educated group, for whom 
extramarital childbearing is not morally acceptable.  
 
Table 1:   Percentage of extramarital births by the highest educational  
  attainment of mother in selected countries of Central Europe,  
  1990-2005 
 
    Highest educational attainment       










Tertiary  Total 
Austria  1996  26.9  32.6  25.7  24.7  19.7  28.0 
Austria  2005  28.7  43.3  38.6  35.3  30.6  36.5 
Czech Republic  1990  26.6  7.7  4.1  3.3  8.6 
Czech Republic  1995  44.5  14.4  7.8  5.7  15.6 
Czech Republic  2005  67.6  37.2  23.8  13.7  31.7 
Poland  2003  39.4  16.9  12.6  6.6  15.8 
    Completed years of education       
    0-7  8  9-12  13+    Total 
Hungary  1990  49.1  16.2  6.3  4.5    13.1 
Hungary  1998  63.5  33.0  16.9  10.4    26.6 
 
SOURCES: Statistics Austria 1997 and 2006, FSO 1991, CZSO 1996 and 2006, GUS 2004 and Pongrácz 2002 (Table 3) Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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However, in all cases, the trend over time is uniform, towards a higher share of 
non-marital  births  among  women  of  all  educational  levels.  Thus,  extramarital 
childbearing (and, frequently, also cohabitation) constitutes a peculiar feature of the 
second demographic transition, which spreads from the lowest-educated population 
to the more affluent and higher-educated social groups. It is plausible that, among 
the  higher-educated  women,  non-marital  childbearing  usually  takes  place  in  the 
context  of  stable  cohabiting  unions,  whereas  lower-educated  women  frequently 
experience lone motherhood or childbearing within unstable partnerships. Kiernan’s 
(1999) analysis of the FFS data indicates that non-graduate women are more likely 
than  graduate  women  to  have  a  child  before  experiencing  any  partnership. 
Numerous  studies  conducted  in  the  United  States  show  that  non-marital 
childbearing and unstable unions are concentrated especially among the women at 
the  bottom  of  the  educational  and  income  distribution,  and  that  this  group 
increasingly differs from the higher-income and higher-educated group (Lundberg 
and  Pollak  2007).  McLanahan  (2004)  argues  that  the  rising  divergence  in 
partnership, family, and work trajectories of lower-educated and higher-educated 
women  and  their  partners  is  linked  to  an  increasingly  disadvantaged  economic 
position  of  the  former  group.  This  argument,  which  is  likely  to  hold  for  most 
societies of Europe as well, suggests that some behaviours associated with the STD 
spread  first  as  a  reaction  or  an  accommodation  to  economic  and  social 
disadvantages, rather than as an alternative lifestyle of highly educated individuals.  
 
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
The progression of the characteristic changes in family behaviour  
Chapters in this collection demonstrate that wide-sweeping changes in partnership 
and family behaviour have spread to all parts of Europe. More recently, this trend 
has been particularly pronounced in Southern Europe and in the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see also Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004), 
which had been often perceived as rather ‘immune’ to the rapid diffusion of the 
transition.  In  country  after  country,  births  and  marriages  have  been  postponed 
intensively. Cohabitation has become a common choice for a first union, and has 
increasingly emerged as a substitution for marriage. Meanwhile, marriage rates have 
plummeted, and the connection between marriage, sexual life, and childbearing has 
rapidly  eroded.  The  spread  of  cohabitation  and  LAT  arrangements  have  been 
connected  with  an  increase  in  partnership  instability,  which  is  also  signalled  by 
persistently high or increasing divorce rates. Some ‘traditional’ pathways to first Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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partnership  and  first  birth  have  become  unusual  in  the  countries  that  have 
progressed furthest in the second demographic transition (see Overview Chapter 4). 
Sexual initiation takes place well before the formation of a first partnership, not only 
because of an earlier onset of sexual activity, but also owing to a postponement of 
partnership formation. ‘Direct’ marriage not preceded by cohabitation has become 
in  some  countries  an  unusual  pathway  typical  of  specific  religious  and  ethnic 
groups. Furthermore, having a first child within marriage is becoming a ‘minority 
experience’ in a rising number of countries. Symptomatic of this change is a marked 
decline  in  the  normative  pressure  to  marry  in  the  case  of  out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies,  leading  to  a  gradual  disappearance  of  the  once  relatively  common 
phenomenon of ‘shotgun marriages.’ If not permanent, the new family behaviour 
appears to be a long-standing trait of the European demographic landscape, which is 
here to stay for many decades.  
In the post-communist countries of Europe, where the new behavioural trends 
are often thought of as arising in response to the economic crisis and ‘anomie’ of the 
early 1990s, these changes have been further intensifying during the recent period of 
higher  prosperity  and  economic  recovery.  While  fertility  and  marriage 
postponement, as well as voluntary childlessness, have been heralded by higher-
educated women, lower-educated individuals are often at the forefront of the rise of 
unstable  living  arrangements  and  non-marital  fertility.  Paradoxically,  higher-
educated people, who have generally more positive attitudes towards the new family 
forms, resist longest the erosion of the ‘bourgeois family,’ especially when they 
decide to have children. 
 
 
Changes in family-related values and attitudes 
Attitudes  towards  children,  family,  and  sexuality  remain  widely  differentiated 
across Europe, to an extent which is impossible to portray accurately in this review. 
However,  a  common  direction  of  changes  can  be  clearly  detected  across  all 
countries (perhaps with the exception of Albania), which is generally in agreement 
with the second demographic transition hypothesis:  
 
-  a move towards tolerant and generally positive attitudes regarding intimate 
relationships among unmarried and un-partnered people, including young 
adults and teenagers  
-  a positive regard for cohabitation as a specific premarital stage, and its 
rising recognition as an alternative to marriage Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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-  a  higher  tolerance  of  non-family  living  arrangements  and  voluntary 
childlessness 
 
Marriage  and  childbearing  have  increasingly  become  optional  parts  of 
individual biographies, even in countries that have been until recently considered 
rather  ‘conservative.’  For  example,  the  Spain  chapter  emphasises  the  increasing 
freedom  in  the  design  of  individual  life  projects:  “inherited  models  of  family 
organization have ceased to be binding; the form that family life eventually adopts 
have thus come to depend on the negotiation” (Delgado et al. 2008:1087). These 
shifts do not imply, however, that family has become an obsolete institution. It has 
undergone a remarkable transformation: “feelings and love have become the centre 
of the family, a trend that explains the weakening of the conjugal bond, the loss of 
popularity  of  marriage,  and  the  growing  complexity  of  marital  trajectories” 
(Toulemon et al. 2008:524). At the same time, the family appears to have adapted 
well  to  the  increase  in  individual  autonomy  (France  chapter).  Perhaps  the  most 
important indication of the continuing strength of the family is the persistent high 
value  attached  to  family  and  children  and  the  overwhelmingly  positive  attitude 
towards parenthood. This may partly explain the absence of a negative association 
between  the  second  demographic  transition,  and  fertility  level  as  well  as 
childbearing intentions in contemporary Europe. 
 
 
Structural constraints may facilitate some SDT trends among disadvantaged 
social groups 
The  experience  of  the  post-communist  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
highlights the importance of structural factors in facilitating the trends associated 
with the SDT. The initial contributions (e.g., van de Kaa 1987) tended to emphasise 
the  prominence  of  normative  and  value  changes  for  an  initiation  of  the  second 
demographic  transition.  When  economic  factors  entered  the  SDT  narrative, 
economic prosperity was perceived as an engine of cultural dynamics: it leads to an 
increase in individual aspirations and to the accentuation of higher-order needs and 
individual  self-fulfilment  (for  a  more  detailed  elaboration  see  Lesthaeghe  and 
Surkyn  1988).  This  mechanism  seems  to  be  instrumental  for  explaining  value 
changes  symptomatic  of  the  SDT.  However,  some  characteristic  behavioural 
changes, such as the rapid rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing, can 
also be driven by the emergence of new structural factors that make such behaviour 
more attractive for people with a socially disadvantaged background. This was often 
the  case  during  the  transition  process  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe:  the  rapid Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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restructuring of society towards a capitalist market economy led to much social and 
economic  turbulence,  as  well  as  to  increased  anomie,  which  most  affected  the 
lowest-educated  individuals.  As  many  structural  characteristics  of  capitalist 
economies, such as huge income disparities, unstable  working conditions, and a 
need  for  more  lifestyle  flexibility  (see  also  Mills  and  Blossfeld  2005)  are  not 
compatible with the ‘bourgeois ideal’ of a stable family consisting of a married 
couple with (a) child(ren), lower-educated individuals were often at the forefront of 
a  shift  towards  extramarital  childbearing  and  cohabitation.  Perhaps  unwillingly, 
disadvantaged  segments  of  the  population  may  thus  become  trendsetters  of  new 
behaviour,  paving  the  way  to  a  wider  legitimisation  and  acceptance  of  the  new 
family  forms,  which  are  later  openly  embraced  by  the  rising  number  of  highly 
educated individuals.  
 
 
Two pathways of the SDT diffusion 
Such  a  mechanism  of  change  is  consistent  with  the  Ready-Willing-Able  (RWA) 
model of diffusion of new behaviour, which has been advocated by Lesthaeghe and 
his colleagues (e.g., Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn 2006), and which has also been 
adopted  in  this  chapter  for  explaining  the  diffusion  of  the  second  demographic 
transition in the post-communist countries of Europe. If the arguments sketched 
above are valid, we are left with two pathways of behavioural and value changes in 
the course of the second demographic transition. The first one, consistent with the 
‘classical’ narrative of the SDT, sees cultural and value changes as factors driven by 
economic  affluence  and  characterised  by  secular  individualism,  and  by  an 
orientation towards personal self-fulfilment as a precondition to large-scale changes 
in family behaviour. In this case, the new behaviour is first heralded by the more 
educated  and  economically  more  privileged  social  groups,  who  adopt  new 
preferences  with  respect  to  their  living  arrangements  and  childbearing  and  their 
‘coordination’  with  other  domains  of  life  (education,  employment,  leisure).  The 
second pathway may first lead to an emergence of new family behaviour, especially 
among the disadvantaged strata, as a response to changed structural conditions in 
the society, frequently marked by economic crisis. In this case, the new behaviour is 
less driven by new choices and personal preferences, and may constitute a reaction 
to adverse life circumstances. Consequently, as this behaviour spreads, it gradually 
becomes accepted and adopted by other social groups, which in turn leads to the 
changes in attitudes towards it and its continuous diffusion. This diffusion becomes 
self-reinforcing  and  continues  even  at  the  time  when  the  conditions  which  had 
facilitated  an  emergence  of  the  new  behaviour  decline  in  importance  (Kohler, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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Billari, and Ortega 2002). Needless to say, changes in values and behaviour are 
reinforcing  each  other  (e.g.,  Rindfuss  et  al.  2004),  and  none  of  these  pathways 
occurs in a ‘pure form.’ In real life, a mixture of cultural and structural changes may 
lead to differentiated responses and feedback effects among various social groups, 
whose values and life histories may also differ markedly.   
 
 
The importance of the ‘gender revolution’ for the spread of SDT and for 
fertility recuperation  
The  ‘gender  revolution’  was  marked  by  a  huge  expansion  of  higher  education 
among women, their increasingly perfect ability to prevent unwanted pregnancies, 
women’s massive and almost universal participation in the labour market and their 
resulting  economic  independence,  and  also  their  higher  aspirations,  in  which  an 
employment  career  constitutes  an  expected  and  essential  part  of  their  life 
biographies (Goldin 2006). This ‘revolution’ ended what Keyfitz (1986) described 
as  a  societal  ‘conspiracy’  that  maintained  the  image  of  women  as  mothers  and 
wives, enforced a strong socialisation of girls towards these roles and where various 
elements  converged  to  “maintain  women  in  a  position  where  their  time  was 
available for reproduction and for not much else” (Keyfitz 1986: 150). The gender 
revolution in a broad sense appears to be one of the most important factors driving 
the trends associated with the second demographic transition. Countries that were 
first to embrace the principles of gender equality, particularly the Nordic countries, 
now score highest in the SDT progression (Sweden chapter). Macro-level analysis 
by  Kalmijn  (2007)  shows  that  the  proportion  of  women  in  paid  employment  is 
linked  to  lower  marriage  rates,  higher  divorce  rates,  and  higher  levels  of 
cohabitation.  ‘Women’s  liberation’  might  possibly  also  explain  the  positive 
association  between  the  second  demographic  transition  and  fertility.  Countries 
where many people adhered early to egalitarianism and women’s emancipation also 
enacted  at  an  early  stage  different  policies  supporting  gender  equality,  which 
subsequently reduced the incompatibility of work and childrearing. These policies 
are conducive for the ‘recuperation’ of fertility at later childbearing ages, especially 
among  more-educated  women,  which I found to be strongly associated  with the 
transition. In addition, the ideology of gender equality nurtures more equal division 
of household and childcare tasks between partners, reducing gender asymmetries 
within  the  family  that  may  strongly  contribute  to  low  fertility  in  many  parts  of 
Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe (Esping-Andersen 1999, McDonald 2000; 
see also Lithuania chapter).  Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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As women increasingly outnumber men in tertiary education in most OECD 
countries  (OECD  2005),  their  economic  and  employment  position  is  poised  to 
improve  further  in  the  future,  whereas  more  men  will  probably  become 
unemployed, unemployable, and economically disadvantaged. This may bring yet 
unforeseen consequences for the course of future family and fertility change, some 
of which may be linked to the rising inability of many women to find a suitable 
partner matching their level of education and income.    
 
 
Further progression of the transition and the likely future trends in fertility 
The experiences of the Nordic countries, of France, and also of the United States, 
indicate that the SDT does not inevitably lead to long-term sub-replacement fertility, 
especially when fertility rates are analysed in a cohort perspective. The future of the 
fertility – SDT relationship remains open. It is possible that the progression of the 
SDT in countries with currently very low fertility, such as Italy and Spain, will lead 
to a wider acceptance and the further spread of very low fertility, and of a one-child 
family  norm  even  when  the  structural  constraints  initially  responsible  for  a 
pronounced fertility decline eventually diminish. In other words, low fertility rates 
in the last two decades would engender low family size preferences among younger 
cohorts  that  were  socialised  under  the  new  low-fertility  regime,  a  possibility 
envisioned  by  Lutz,  Skirbekk,  and  Testa  (2006).  But  an  alternative  outcome  is 
possible  as  well:  some  structural  factors  that  are  arguably  affecting  fertility 
behaviour  in  many  countries  may  be  seen  as  an  outcome  of  a  delayed  societal 
adaptation  to  the  progressing  second  demographic  transition.  In  this  view,  the 
persistence of the traditional family norms and expectations, the continuation of 
family  policies  tailored  to  support  the  ‘male  breadwinner  model,’  and  the 
persistence  of  marked  gender  inequality  within  the  family  in  many  low-fertility 
societies may be seen as temporary features of societies that failed to adapt to the 
changing character of family and partnership behaviours. Then, the very low fertility 
observed in  Southern Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, and the German-speaking 
countries may be perceived as a temporary outcome of the second demographic 
transition (see also Sobotka 2008), whose importance may diminish if the society 
embraces gender equality and adapts to the new patterns of family behaviour. This 
view is voiced in the chapter on Italy, which suggests that the slow spread of non-
marital  fertility  in  Italy  is  a  syndrome  of  an  “uncompleted  second  demographic 
transition,” (De Rose et al. 2008:678) which is in part responsible for very low 
fertility in Italy. More generally, the authors view “a lack of modernity” as “a main 
cause of the current depressed childbearing level” (De Rose et al. 2008:679).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 8 
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On the usefulness of the second demographic transition concept  
In conclusion, the second demographic transition seems to be particularly useful as 
an  umbrella  concept  that  encompasses  a  broad  range  of  interrelated  changes  in 
sexuality, family, and partnership behaviours and attitudes, as well as a massive 
postponement of parenthood. This chapter has shown that, despite widely different 
social and economic contexts, the SDT provides a powerful narrative reflecting well 
the shared trajectories in the evolution of the new model of family and reproduction 
in Europe during the last four decades. As the relationship of the SDT to fertility 
levels is shown to diverge from the originally envisioned negative association, the 
term itself may be seen as problematic—it is too suggestive of an irreversible and 
predictable  shift  in  reproductive  behaviour,  similar  to  the  concept  of  the  (first) 
demographic  transition.  However,  as  the  term  has  become  firmly  established,  it 
would be fruitless to attempt to change it. The SDT is also potentially problematic 
as a scientific theory. On one hand, it appears to hold quite well on a very general 
level: if, for instance, the SDT concept were used to foresee the trends in family and 
fertility behaviours after the establishment of democracy and market capitalism in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  after  1989,  it  would  have  provided  a  very  sound 
projection of general change. On the other hand, the SDT is too fuzzy as a theory 
when scrutinised on a  finer level. By definition,  historical contingency, context-
specific institutions, and multiple interactions between ideational and behavioural 
changes always make it extremely difficult to construct a theory that can precisely 
specify conditions under which a certain change in behaviour takes place. But the 
experience of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which can be seen as a 
giant demographic laboratory, indicates that much more research needs to be done 
in order to pinpoint the most important structural and cultural factors that stand at 
the root of the SDT in diverse settings, and to specify how different facets of SDT 
behaviour are initiated, and later progress across social groups.  
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Appendix   
Construction of the SDT indexes used in the analysis  
Note  that  country-specific  values  of  SDT1  and  SDT2  indexes  are  displayed  in 
Sobotka (2008, Table AP-1, pp. 86-87). 
 
SDT1 index (behavioural dimension) 
This index, composed for 34 countries, is based on the following indicators for 2004 
(or the latest year available): 
 
1)  Mean age of mother at birth of first child (MAFB); 
2)  Sum  of  age-specific  fertility  rates  below  age  20,  per  1000  women 
(TEENFERT); 
3)  Percentage of non-marital births (NONMAR); 
4)  Total first marriage rate (TFMR); 
5)  Mean age at first marriage (MAFM); 
6)  Total divorce rate (TDR). 
 
Finally, the index is adjusted upwards by 0.5 if more than 10 per cent of co-
residential unions were made up by cohabiting couples (data for 2001 based on 
Philipov 2005 and national data sources). Maximum, minimum and mean values of 
these indicators and the assigned SDT scores are displayed in table AP-2. 
 
SDT2 index (attitudes and values dimension) 
This  index  is  based  on  the  1999/2000  results  of  the  European  Values  Study, 
published in Halman (2001). It is based on the responses in 29 countries to the 
following questions and statements: 
 
1)  “…how  important  it  is  in  your  life:  leisure  time”  (LEISURE,  %  “very 
important”) 
2)  “How  often  do  you  spend  time  in  church,  mosque,  or  synagogue” 
(CHURCH, % “every week”); 
3)  “Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control 
you feel you have over the way your life turns out?” (CONTROL, mean 
value  on  the  scale  of  1  (=none  control  at  all)  to  10  (= a  great  deal  of 
control)); Sobotka: Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe  
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4)  “Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or 
is this not necessary?” (NEED_KIDS, % responses “not necessary”); 
5)  “Marriage is an outdated institution” (MARRIAGE, % “agree”); 
6)  “A job is alright, but what women really want is a home and children” 
(F_HOME, % “agree strongly”); 
7)  “One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not 
earned it by their behaviour and attitudes” (PAR_RESPECT, % “agree”); 
8)  “Do you approve or disapprove abortion (…) where a married couple does 
not want to have any more children?” (ABORTION, % “approve”). 
 
Several questions were not asked in all the participating countries; the SDT2 
index  for  these  countries  was  based  on  the  mean  score  of  the  responses  to  the 
remaining items. Maximum, minimum and mean values of these indicators and the 
assigned SDT scores are displayed in table AP-2. 
 
 
Table AP-1:  Variables used for computing the SDT indexes: Mean, maximum,  
  minimum and threshold values for selected SDT scores  
  (0, 5, and 10) 
 













Index SDT1               
MAFB  <24  27  >30  23.29  29.30  26.60  4.3 
TEENFERT  >180  90  0  26.0  209.3  84.4  5.3 
NONMAR  0  30  >60  4.9  63.7  32.0  5.3 
TFMR  >0.80  0.60  <0.40  0.405  0.826  0.577  5.6 
MAFM  <23  27  >31  22.91  30.90  26.72  4.6 
TDR  <0.15  0.35  >0.55  0.11  0.55  0.36  5.2 
Index SDT2               
LEISURE  <16  32  >48  15.5  54.2  31.5  4.8 
CHURCH  >30  15  0  3.1  34.2  14.8  5.2 
CONTROL  <5.3  6.4  >7.5  5.4  7.6  6.7  6.2 
NEED_KIDS  <5  45  >85  5.9  92.9  45.9  5.1 
MARRIAGE  <6  20  >34  8.3  36.3  18.7  4.5 
F_HOME  >35  20  <5  3.0  34.1  17.4  5.8 
PAR_RESPECT  0  30  >60  13.5  67.3  29.6  4.9 
ABORTION  <20  55  >90  15.2  85.1  56.9  5.3 
 